In 1982 the Task Force and the Battle Group were both commanded by former Submariners. It is not surprising that the Submarine came to have something of a primacy in Royal Navy thinking during the Cold War – a substantial part of its role was anti-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic. Warfare beneath the waves dominated its strategy and tactics.
By their very nature, the work of Submarines is not as easy to pin down as that of surface vessels. Their movements are not routinely reported, nor are their patrols or operations. The Vanguard class of SSBN’s provide the UK’s nuclear deterrent and, presumably, would not have a role in any south Atlantic war. As such we need not discuss them in this context.
The picture in 1982
In 1982 submarine warfare was one of the Royal Navy’s strongest priorities. Therefore submarine tactics within the Royal Navy were relatively sharp. As well as protecting the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap from Soviet Submarines, the Royal Navy also had a sizeable fleet of both nuclear and diesel-electric hunter killer submarines. The nuclear boats were primarly intended for countering Soviet subs, but also had anti-ship capability. The diesel electric boats of the Oberon and Porpoise classes were designed primarily for patrolling and surveillance, but were also useful in inserting special forces and attack.
In 1982 the UK had 12 Nuclear attack submarines (1 Dreadnought class, 2 Valiant Class, 3 Churchill Class and 6 Swiftsure Class) and 15 diesel-electric submarines (13 of Oberon class and 2 of the Porpoise Class). Conqueror, Courageous, Spartan, Splendid and Valiant – almost half of the RN’s fleet of SSN’s – deployed south, along with the lone diesel electric boat, Onyx. This heavy deploymen of SSN’s played a vital part in the war, but also left defences against the Soviet Union threadbare indeed closer to home.
The picture in 2009
The Royal Navy’s submarine flotilla has undergone a radical transformation since 1982. With the end of the Cold War the number of Submarines was cut. The Upholder class of diesel-electrics, intended as replacements for the Oberon and Porpoise classes, were sold to Canada, leaving the Royal Navy without a conventional submarine capability. Although their endurance is much lower than nuclear boats, they are cheaper and ideal for inserting special forces.
Currently the Royal Navy possesses 6 boats of the Trafalgar class of SSN’s. They are a refinement of the Swiftsure class, one of which is still in service. However, the Trafalgar class are due to begin decomissioning, with the first, HMS Trafalgar, in December 2009.
The much-hyped Astute Class of SSN’s, of which seven are planned, will replace the Trafalgar and Swiftsure Classes. As well as torpedoes, these can also deploy the Tomahawk cruise missile – a potentially battle winning strategic weapon. Mere knowledge of its accuracy and range would instill fear in the enemy out of all proportion to the actual damage it might cause. Similar to the Black Buck Vulcan raids in 1982, which is fortunate given that the RAF no longer possesses an aircraft with the range to repeat the exploits of Vulcan 607. Realising that Britain could strike at the mainland, the Argentines redeployed valuable assets to protect mainland targets, diverting resources from the Falklands themselves. The same effect would be caused by the use, or potential use of Tomahawk.
The flaws of one class of seven Submarines replacing two classes of 13 are pretty obvious. No matter how advanced, any ship can only be in one place at any one time. They mave have the capability of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles, which would be a serious stand-off threat, but only having seven submarines would leave very few available for any operations. If one or two were in refit or maintenance, and perhaps one or two on patrols, it would take time to make them available for service.
In 1982 the Submarine service performed a valuable function in keeping the Argentine Navy in port. The sinking of the Belgrano effectively sent enemy ships back to harbour, allowing the task force freedom of the seas. It was only by the fog of war that the Argentine Carrier, Vienticinco de Mayo, was not sunk also. Perhaps the biggest assets of a submarine are that it is unseen, and also the knowledge that it is there, somewhere, with a fear as to what it can inflict.
The Royal Navy had a strong force of Submarines in 1982, which were well practiced in countering Soviet boats in waters closer to home. That they performed so well in the South Atlantic is not surprising. presumably the submarine fleet does not have the same patrolling commitments that it had during the Cold War, but might this also result in a loss of ‘edge’?
Has the submarine slipped in importance to the Royal Navy? It would seem so, in terms of numbers and in terms of doctrine. There are certainly a lot less boats available, although those that are available do have a crucial strategic weapon in Tomahawk.