Tag Archives: argentina

Refighting the Falklands War (2012): Land Forces

English: 2 para guarding POWs Port Stanley 1982

In 1982, the quality of British troops held out when the task force’s land troops came up against the Argentine Army. Much has changed since 1982, both in the British Army and the Argentine Army. Land Forces would play a pivotal part in any future battle for the Falklands, whether it be defending them, or attempting to retake them.

If the Falkland Islands were threatened, one would imagine that the first reaction of the British Government would be to reinforce the lone infantry Company at Mount Pleasant. This would probably involve flying in another infantry Battalion via Ascension, and some extra air defence in the form of Rapier and Starstreak of the Royal Artillery. An infantry Battalion is usually on standby as a spearhead Battalion to move anywhere in the world at short notice.

If, however, the islands were taken by Argentina, then larger land forces would be required to land and retake them. There are 9 Brigades available to the British Armed Forces for rapid deployment anywhere in the world:

There are also a number of other administrative Brigades, that are not geared up towards active deployment. These are the umbrellas for battalions and Regiments not earmarked for deployments, but which could in times of crisis be called upon. In such a manner in 1982, the Scots and Welsh Guards were deployed after finishing a stint of public duties in London, as they happened to be available.

As in 1982, we would probably be looking to the spearhead Brigades, ie 16 Air Assault and 3 Commando Brigade to bear the brunt of any operations. Realistically, with the shipping available, the likely Argentine Garrison to be faced and the troops available, any mission to retake the Falklands would probably consist of two reinforced Brigades, with a similar level of supporting troops – artillery, engineers, etc – as was seen in 1982.

The fly in the ointment, at present, would be Afghanistan. Currently light infantry and mechanised Brigades serve 6 month stints in Afghanistan, meaning that Brigades such as 16 AA and 3 Cdo have spent up 6 months of every two years in Helmand. Prior to this, they are training up for the role, and afterwards building themselves up again. Of course, if it really came to it, troops arriving back from Afghanistan could be sent down south a week later, but this would hardly be ideal. In an ideal world, 16 AA and 3 Cdo Brigades would both be available. In the next best case scenario it would be 3 Cdo Brigade plus one of the light infantry Brigades, and the least satisactory scenario would be 16 AA plus a light infantry Brigade. 3 Cdo Brigade, of course, would be invaluable due to their amphibious role.

There can be few personnel in the British Army who have not served at least one tour of Afghanistan, and many have probably served more, as well as in Iraq and possibly in Northern Ireland, Kosovo and Bosnia for some older sweats. The British soldier of 2012 is much more experienced and battle-hardened than many of his predecessors, and thanks to some early disasters in Iraq, personnel equipment seems to have seriously improved. In 1982, many troops went down with trench foot thanks to having inferior boots for cold weather. Most weapons systems have been updated – for example the SLR with the SA80, the Bren with the Minimi, and Milan with Javelin. A lot of the new vehicles that have been procured for use in Afghanistan to replace Land Rover are great for that theatre, but would be totally unsuitable to peat bogs in the Falklands. As in 1982, Scimitars and others of the CVR(T) family would be very handy.

Ideologically, the British Army is in a strange place compared to 1982. The last ten years have been spent largely fighting counter-insurgency wards against extremist islamic terrorists – firstly in Iraq, and then Afghanistan. To what extent could the Army go from fighting in the sand to fighting in chilly mountain ranges overnight? One suspects so, given the similarity between the Falklands and the Brecon Beacons, for one. Could it summon up the agression for a conventional war, after devoting much of its attention to ‘wars among the people’? I suspect that this wouldn’t be a problem – in 1982 the British Army was geared towards fighting the Russians in North West Europe, and also dealing with terrorists in Northern Ireland, which especially provided very good training for junior leaders. And unlike 1982, most British troops are not already commited to NATO.

The Argentine Army abolished conscription after the fall of the military dictatorship in 1983. In 1982, the Argentine Garrison consisted of two strong Brigades, which consisted of 8 Regiments, the equivalent of a British Battalion. The Argentines also had many support troops, in terms of artillery, engineers and armoured cars. But as has often been written, in 1982 the Argentines had to keep their best troops in South America to guard against a possible Chilean attack. As a result, most of the troops deployed to the Falklands were inexperienced conscripts, and many were from warmer parts of the country, not suited to fighting in the cold and wet Falklands.

In 2012, the Argentine Army has 10 Brigades in total – two armoured, three mechanised, three mountain, one paratrooper and one jungle. In particular, a Rapid Deployment Forces is built around the Paratroop Brigade. The Argentine Marines consists of 4 Infantry Battalions with supporting troops. With the addition of dedicated Mountain Brigades, the Argentines could probably provide a better garrison for the Falklands than they did in 1982.Of course, what we do not know is how well trained their troops are – although the Argentine Army does seem to have benefited from increased international co-operation. In addition, friendly relations with the rest of South America means that Argentina would not have to leave units behind to guard her own frontiers.

But, as with the British Task Force, the Argentine’s real problem would be getting their troops to the islands in the first place. With one sole amphibious ship, and the tricky prospect of taking Mount Pleasant intact, they might have a bit of trouble actually getting them to the Falklands in the first place. But if a re-run of 1982 was to be experienced, but with modern forces, I would expect a British land force to edge it based on experience and training.

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Refighting the Falklands War (2012): Submarine warfare

English: Cropped version of public domain File...

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In 2009 I identified a serious risk of the Royal Navy losing a useful mass of numbers when it comes to submarines.

As in 1982, one would imagine that the Submarine service would be expected to shadow the Argentine fleet, and try to take out some of its inventory – in particular the Exocet equipped ships that might cause our surface vessels trouble. They would also be expect to loiter off the Argentine mainland watching for aircraft and shipping, to provide land strike capability, and also to slip ashore special forces.

The Astute Class are regarded as the best submarines in the world, perhaps on a par with the US Navy’s equivalent Virginia Class. According to one website, she is as quiet as a baby dolphin, which probably makes her as good as undetectable in skilled hands. And a submarine that cannot be detected can act with impunity. And knowing that British submarines can roam around the South Atlantic at will is bound to put the fear of god into Argentine naval officers.

The Astutes carry advanced sonar and weapons systems, more weapons than any other British submarine previously – Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles and Spearfish torpedoes. With a range of 1,240 miles, this means that Astute could accurately target sites in North Africa sitting off the South Coast of England. Such a range and sophistication really would cause severe problems to the Argentine forces. The only problem might be replenishment of Tomahawk stocks, both in terms of the US allowing us to purchase more, and then getting them to the South Atlantic. But as I identified in 2009, Tomahawk would provide a more accurate and less risky alternative to the Black Buck Vulcan raids.

In terms of slipping ashore Special Forces, I must confess I had always laboured under the impression that bigger SSN’s were not as ideal for the task of inshore work as the smaller, old diesel electrics where. After all, in 1982 HMS Onyx was sent south reputedly to work close inshore with special forces. Yet it seems that the new Astute Class boats will be able to use a piece of American technology, the Dry Dock Shelter (DDS). The DDS enables special forces teams to enter and exit the submarine much easier. As with much special forces and submarine technology specifications are hazy, but I can imagine the DDS being pretty useful.

The big problem – and this is the same as with Destroyers and Frigates – is that we simply do not have enough Submarines. By the time the Astute class are finished in 2024 – yes 2024, in 12 years time! – the RN will have seven SSN Submarines – critically short. Of course, as with any vessels a number of these will be in refit at any time. As the Astute class boats are commissioned – at a rate of one every two or three years – the Trafalgar Class will decommission, with the Navy maintaining a level of seven SSN’s in service. Of course, there is a strong possibility that the Trafalgars might start falling apart long before then.

The problem with Submarine procurement, is that with the political desire to ‘buy British’, there is only really one option – BAE Systems yard at Barrow. In order to maintain a healthy programme of orders and ensure that a skilled workforce and facilities can be maintained, submarine procurement and constructions works on a ‘drumbeat’ policy – stretching out orders to ensure that there are no quiet periods when workers would have to be laid off. With the MOD looking at renewing the nuclear deterrent SSBN’s by the mid 2020′s, the building programme for the Astutes has been stretched to cover until when work is due to begin on the SSBN replacements. All very well, but according to the National Audit Office this delay will cost more, to the point at which if the boats had been built faster an eighth Astute could have been built. The MOD decided against this, however, no doubt fearful of the running costs of operating another boat.

Obviously, due to their nature it is very difficult to find out too much about submarine deployments, or submarine technological specifications. But if it is true, that an Astute can watch shipping from off the North American coast, then even one Astute in the South Atlantic could provide a wealth of intelligence without actually firing its weapons. And that is actually the beauty of submarines – you don’t know where they are, so you have to assume that they could be anywhere and could strike at any time - a real hinderance on your freedom of operations if you are an Admiral looking to take and defend the Falkland Islands.

In 1982 the Task Force deployed 5 SSN’s of the Churchill, Valiant and Swiftsure Classes, and one diesel electric Oberon class Boat. In 1982 the RN was geared up for submarine warfare in the North Atlantic, and hence had a considerable submarine arm, in terms of numbers and experience. In 1982 the Royal Navy had 11 SSN’s to chose from, and no less than 13 Oberon Class conventional boats. 24 boats, whilst in 2012, we would be able to choose from 7 at the most.

A theme is emerging – a Royal Navy with first class assets, but with not nearly enough of them.

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Refighting the Falklands War (2012): Auxiliaries and Merchant vessels

English: NRP Bérrio, fleet support tanker of t...

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In 2009 I looked at the role of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the Merchant Navy. But since then, it has occured to me that their roles are so similar and interlinked that it makes much more sense to look at them in unison.

The RFA of 2012 is woefully small. Even when we consider that the Royal Navy has contracted in size, the RFA has shrunk beyond proportion to that contraction. It can only field:

It should be noted that I have excluded the Bay Class LPD’s, which rightfully belong under ‘Amphibious Warfare’. This is absolutely microscopic when compared to the RFA effort that was required in 1982. In 1982 the RFA utilised:

  • 10 Tankers of four different classes
  • 2 Fort Class replenishment ships
  • 1 Helicopter Support ship
  • 2 Ammunition store ships
  • 1 Ness Class store ship

In addition, the Merchant Navy provided a very sizeable contribution to the logistics effort, and ships taken up from trade and chartered consisted of the following:

  • 9 troopships (to lift two brigades)
  • 4 aircraft/helicopter support ships
  • 1 ammunition ship
  • 1 general transport ship
  • 14 Oil Tankers
  • 1 Water Tanker
  • 2 Ocean going tugs
  • 1 mooring vessel
  • 2 repair ships
  • 3 Refrigerated stores ships
  • 1 hospital ship
  • 2 despatch vessels
  • 1 minesweeper support ship

I have been having a bit of trouble getting access to any kind of information of what ships comprise the Merchant Navy in the present day. Bearing in mind the kind of effort it took to maintain a task force in the South Atlantic 30 years ago, a logistical effort would probably be required on a similar kind of level. If such ships could not be requisitioned from British flagged companies, ships would have to be chartered – at considerable cost. It is surely never ideal to be chartering ships to take to war.

With the shrinking of the RFA, gaps exist for tankers and general store ships. The six Point Class roll-on roll-off ships could provide a very useful capability of lifting vehicles, equipment, stores and possibly aircraft if needed. RFA Argus could be utilised as a helicopter support ship, and given the utility of the repair ship RFA Diligence, it would seem that similar repair support would be invaluable, given that Diligence has also acted very usefully as a depot ship for submarines and minesweepers in the past. Any vessels – perhaps container ships – that could be quickly converted to transport and operate helicopters would be most useful. Liners and medium to large ferries would be needed as troopships, and if Argus was used for helicopter support another option would be needed for providing hospital ship(s).

There is a serious lack of Tankers in the RFA. With only two Wave Class Fleet Tankers, two smaller Rover Class Tankers and one Leaf Class support tanker, the ability to replenish ships at sea is very minimal indeed. Even then, often the Wave Class ships have been sent on patrol duties, intercepting drug smugglers and pirates and the like. Whilst large commercial tankers could be requisitioned or chartered, it remains to be seen how many of them could replenish ships at sea.

Presumably the Task Force would have use of Ascenscion Island as a staging post. The airfield at Wideawake has been used as RAF Ascencion Island since the War as part of the air bridge between the UK and the South Atlantic. Although Ascencion does not have a harbour, it does provide the only sheltered anchorage en-route to the Falklands. The construction of an aiport on Saint Helena, due for completion in 2015, would radically improve transport links with the South Atlantic. Hence Saint Helena could also be used as a logistics hub. I would be very surprised if the MOD has not leaned on DfID to ensure that St Helena Airport is not capable of supporting military operations if necessary.

Histories of the Falklands War suggest that the Ministry of Defence maintains a list of merchant ships suitable for use in the time of war. In 1982, it was found that many of these were light, cross-channel ferries totally unsuitable to sailing 8,000 miles to the South Atlantic. One would hope that the MOD has a similar list maintained in readiness for a future Falklands War, as it looks like any Task Force would be impossible without a significant Merchant Navy contribution. From a logistical sense, getting a Task Force to the South Atlantic and keeping it there would be of prime importance.

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Refighting the Falklands War (2012): The political dimension

Before we embark on a look at whether a Falklands War could be fought in 2012, I want to add the caveat that here, we are not merely attempting to fight the last war. The Falklands is just a convenient yardstick for judging a fundamental responsibility of Government, our national ability to defend ourselves and our interests. It is, unless the French invade the Channel Islands any time soon, probably the only case in which Britain might have to act unilateraly on the world stage. What we are doing is assessing change over time, comparing 1982 to 2012. In many ways the world has moved on since 1982, so it would inevitably be a very different conflict, much the same as there is hardly likely to be another Battle of Britain any time in the forseeable future.

Any operation at such a distance is inevitably going to be a joint, ‘purple’ operation. In our discussions, I don’t want us to become too centric on any particular Arm or asset. I have no time for single-service narrowmindedness; at some point people need to grow up and consign the spectre of services attempting to out-maneouvre each other to the history books. When armed forces squabble there is only ever one winner – the Treasury.

One aspect that I neglected in my 2009 review, was that of politics – both domestic, regional and international. As Clauszwitz said, war is the pursuit of politics through other means, and this is particularly true of international crises that require military intervention. Very rarely in history have wars been fought for wars sake alone; invariably they are motivated by some kind of politics. Witness the 1982 invasion by Argentina. As this broad spectrum of politics would determine if, when and how a war might be fought, and its potential outcome, it seems only sensible to consider these important factors.

Buenos Aries

In 1982 Argentina was ruled by a military junta. Fighting a brutal internal war and locked in territorial disputes with neighbours, the Malvinas provided a suitable release valve for serious internal problems. Ostensibly, much has changed since then. But has it? Argentina is led by a person whose chief virtue is that they are the widow of the last President (Democracy, love it). Not only that, but Christina Fernandez-Kirchner has developed a reputation not only for tasteless flirting at international summits, but also  coming out with some inflamatory remarks in recent years. Althought it is tempting to think that whilst Argentina is a democracy military action is unlikely, this underestimates the importance of the Malvinas issue to the Argentine psyche – it has the ability to reduce perfectly sane people into a blithering mess. With the global economy in the situation that it is, and with the potential for social and economic unrest, the Malvina’s option is never going to be completely off  the table for Buenos Aires.

South America

In 1982 Argentina was pretty much isolated, as military dictatorships invariably tend to be. Locked in territorial disputes with neighbours, she had to retain most of her best troops to stave off a threat from Chile. In 2o12, the scene is quiet different. As a democracy Argentina is very much in from the cold, and recent years have seen something of a South American love in, with characters such as Lula and Chavez supporting Fernandez-Kirchner’s rantings. Whilst much of this is motivated by the popularity of anti-imperialist rhetoric, there have been several cases of latin american countries denying British ships access to facilities, ostensibly at the behest of Buenos Aires. This regional support would extremely unlikely to deter Argentina.

Yet, if Argentina were to unexpectedly invade the Falklands, as an agressive act without provocation, we might see support from South American countries fall away. Britain has defence links with Brazil, and whilst Chile and Argentina are getting on a lot better nowadays, again, Britain has strong links with Chile. The Argentines and Uruguayans also have underlying issues. Thus, whilst Argentina might not be as isolated as she was in 1982, an invasion would not win her any allies.

London

The current Government clearly believes that there is no threat in the South Atlantic. When posed questions in Parliament about the possiblity of another Falklands War, the Prime Minister simply replied, in a naive Rumsfeldian manner, that as Argentina is a democracy this would be unthinkable.

Putting aside the economic reasoning, the SDSR was, effectively, a 1920′s style 10 year gamble on the part of the Government. That for at least the next ten years, Britain would not have to act on her own militarily, without the aid of allies. Whilst in some respects that is true –  invariably Britain acts as part of an alliance, whether it be EU, NATO or otherwise – all the time Britain has interests around the globe, you can never quite discount the need to intervene on your own. Whilst the British Empire is no more – indeed, empires have had their day - there are still Brits around the globe who want to be British, and who deserve our protection. The problem is, that defence cuts rarely deter threats. Quite the opposite.

Crises rarely tap you on the shoulder to give you fair warning just before they explode. Even when they do, you cannot always rely on your Foreign Office to deal with them properly (ahem, Carrington). That is exactly what I am trying to get across here- in an uncertain world, the only certain thing is that you can expect the unexpected. Who foresaw the Arab Spring, and Lybia in particular? No one predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. And what about the first Gulf War? The moral is very much that you cannot plan for international crises, but you can at least try to put yourself in a position to respond to most scenarios as best you can.

Any Government faced with an invasion of British territory – or any other gross affront to British interests – would be hard pressed to survive. The British public might not be quite the flag waving rabble of Charles and Di’s wedding, but I doubt very much whether any administration surrendering the Falklands would survive. Given the support for the armed forces in recent years, any pictures of  being made to lie prostate on the ground would provoke outrage. In 1982 Thatcher was able to turn things around by hook and crook, but whether that would be possible in 2012 is another matter.

Port Stanley

In 1982 the issue was very clear - the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands were British, and wanted to remain British. In that sense, Britain was acting to defend their rights of self-determination, to live under the sovereignty of their choosing. Virtually all of the Falkland Islanders are of British descent, and whilst there are allegations of Imperialism, in many cases Falklands families have been living there longer than Spanish-descended Argentines have been living in South America. Any Government abandoning the Falkland Islanders to Argentina against their will could expect to be relegated to the opposition benches pretty sharpish, particularly given the place that the Falklands holds in British culture after 1982.

The issue of citizenship, sovereignty and self-determination still remains, yet since 2009 a huge new issue has arisen – that of black gold. Huge fossil fuel reserves have been discovered in the South Atlantic off the Falkland Islands, and ownership of the territorial waters brings with it the right to explore for gas and oil. It might be a coincidence, but Argentine bluff and bluster since the discovery has increased considerably.

Lucrative natural resources have had the ability to cause war more than any other factor in the past 25 or so years. And with the global economy in the doldrums, any means of making money is going to be sought after. Any businesses looking to drill for oil in the South Atlantic will exert considerable lobbying pressure on the UK Government, and indeed on other Governments. The Government might also be more inclined to act to support oil companies, more than it would for a few thousands kelpers. The same goes for fishing rights, albeit on not such a money-spinning level.

United Nations and global opinion

The policy of the United Nations – Security Council and General Assembly – has been unequivocal in its policy on the Falklands – Britain and Argentina should resume negotiations towards a peaceful settlement. Quite how these negotations should come about, what should be negotiated and what a peaceful settlement would comprise, has never been elaborated. Thus the UN, sadly as usual, is as intransigent as it could possibly be.

Any un-mitigated invasion of the Falklands would no doubt be brought before the Security Council. Of the 5 permanent members, the UK would of course vote for action, the US and France would probably be swayed towards the British cause, however China may prove more difficult. And with the current frosty state of relations between Britain and Russia, help from that direction can probably be discounted. The chance of any resolution going through without a veto from one of the permanent 5 members seems unlikely. When we consider the rest of the membership, it is also unlikely that all of them would vote for Britain – anti-colonialism is hot political currency these days, and the non-aligned movement has gained influence in the past few years.

As a key member of the EU and NATO, Britain could in theory call on support from these quarters. However, as in 1982, I would find it hard to believe that France would lend us Charles de Gaulle, or that the US would provide AWACS for us. The best we could probably hope for is sanctions to be placed on Argentina, covert assistance with supplies and basing, and help in covering for our standing patrols, such as in the Gulf or off the horn of Africa, in order to free up slack for a Task Force. We might find ourselves in need of more Tomahawks at some point, in which case we would have to go cap in hand to the US.

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More bluff and bluster from Cristina Kirchner

President of the United States Barack Obama an...

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Regular readers will know that I am not exactly a fan of Argentina‘s current President, one Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. That Argentina is a country that invaded British territory less than 30 years ago isn’t really part of it.Nor is that despite their defeat in 1982 they keep agitating. It’s difficult to have much regard for somebody who clearly has no ability as a politician, and is exploiting an issue and hoodwinking her own citizens. It’s the equivalent of the people of Britain electing Katie Price as PM.

During this week’s Prime Minister’s Questions Tory MP Andrew Rosindell asked Mr Cameron to remind President Barack Obama that “the British government will never accept any kind of negotiations over the South Atlantic archipelago”. This comes a week after the US’s incredibly naive reference to the Falklands as ‘the Malvinas’ in a joint declaration with Argentina.

Mr Cameron, to his credit, responded that “as long as the Falkland Islands want to be sovereign British territory, they should remain sovereign British territory – full stop, end of story.”

Kirchner called Cameron’s comments an “expression of mediocrity, and almost of stupidity”. Really, I’m not making it up. Also that  the British people “continue to be a crude colonial power in decline”. Kirchner’s new-found confidence no doubt come after the US’s pro-Argentinian stance became clear last week.  The hypocrisy is outstanding. The Falklands existed and were settled by British people before Argentina even existed. The majority of Argentinians are of Spanish settler descent – are they all going to go home, and leave South America to the indigenous people?

Earlier this week a Falkland Islander became the first person from the British territory to accept Argentinian citizenship. Predictably, Argentina made a big deal about it, incorporating giving this gentleman (I’m not going to repeat his name) his identity card during a ceremony to mark the end of the Falklands War. Whatever his reasons, he’s putting his homeland at risk by inflating the Argentinians ambitions and appearing to validate their viewpoint. That over 200 British men died to liberate the Falklands, we should never forget.

It’s funny that Argentina has been ramping up its stance over the Falklands in the past year or two. First oil is discovered in the South Atlantic. Argentina is also suffering from a very deep recession, and the associated problems that go with it. Kirchner is unpopular and is low in the opinion polls. There is a presidential election in October, and Kirchner has yet to declare if she is a candidate or not. Using the Falklands issue is a pretty basic ploy in Argentine politics – it seems to make normally sane people foam at the mouth.

I don’t normally go in for jingoism, or anything that might be seen as jingoism. But I want any Falkland Islanders reading this to know that the people of Britain are with you.

 

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Admirals urge re-think on Harrier axing

A group of former senior Royal Navy officers have today urged the Government to rethink its plans to scrap HMS Ark Royal and the Harrier fleet. In an open letter to The Times Admiral Lord West of Spithead, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald, Vice-Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham, Vice-Admiral John McAnally and Major-General Julian Thompson argue that the recently announced defence cuts “practically invite” Argentina to re-invade the Falklands, and that such an invasion would be a national humiliation on the level of the fall of Singapore during the Second World War. Julian Thompson and Lord West in particular have got more of an insight into this matter than most, having been the commander of 3 Commando Brigade and HMS Ardent respectively in 1982.

Building on Lord West’s recent speech in the House of Lords, the letter goes on to explain that the Tornado fleet will need re-engining in 2014, at a cost of £1.4bn – roughly the savings expected from scrapping the Harrier. They are quite right too that the Harrier can take off from much shorter airstrips, has a much quicker response time, is better at providing close air support, and can remain in service until 2023 with little investment. At risk of sounding like a broken record, the Harrier vs. Tornado face-off clearly had more sinister agendas going on behind the scenes than mere defence and cost-cutting.

Finally – and most pertinently, in my view – the Admirals point out that the last Treasury-driven Defence ’10-year-rule’ came in the inter-war period (prompted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, a certain Winston Churchill), and history tells us the folly of that particular policy. I wrote some time ago about the historical parallels between the current Government’s 10 year naval aviation gap and the catastrophic 10-year assumption between the wars. Any aggressor almost always has the initiative; take for instance the Falklands invasion in 1982, and to a lesser extent Germany in 1939. If you leave your defence planning dormant until a threat emerges, the threat has the initiative and will already be on top of you before you have any chance to respond.

There are two kinds of threat: an immediate unidentified threat (such as the Falklands), or the looming threat which is prone to being ignored by weak politicians (such as Hitler in the 1930′s). There’s never much you can do specifically about an unidentified threat specifically, apart from making sure your forces are flexible enough to react quickly if needs must. But wilfully ignoring clear and looming threats is at beat folly, and at worst treasonable.

And the comments from the Defence Minister Nick Harvey are naive in the extreme. Four Eurofighters, an infantry company and an obsolete Destroyer are not a defence against invasion. They’re a better tripwire than in 1982, but a tripwire none the less. The potential for reinforcing British forces in the Falklands is minimal now, and will be non-existent after the SDSR’s effects have hit home. That is the key point that Harvey fails to grasp – if anything were to happen in the South Atlantic, we could do virtually nothing beyond what we already have there.

And while we’re talking about naive politicians, how about the Defence Secretary’s comments recently about how Argentina is a vibrant peace-loving country playing a full role on the international scene – hasn’t he heard any of Mrs. Kirchner’s rants over the past few years? Has he not heard about Argentina’s plans to acquire a landing ship from France? Its the same country, with the same kind of Malvinas complex and social problems as in 1982. Sure, Argentina may not be governed by a military junta, but can you take seriously any ‘democracy’ where the President is the last President’s wife? South America is clearly an un-predictable and volatile part of the world.

A Government getting its military history from the Janet and John books whilst wearing rose tinted glasses. And its policy from an ideology that places swingeing cuts over protecting its citizens. Will Dave and Boy George backtrack? Somehow I doubt it…

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Argentinian President thanks Uruguay

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, President of A...

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Image via Wikipedia)

I’ve only just picked up on this story, having been away last week, but I think its shows the dubious quality of politics in South America. It would be hilarious if it wasn’t so worrying. The story appeared in the Portsmouth News last week.

President Cristina Kirchner – in a wonderful show of democracy, the wife of the previous President – launched a video thanking the President of Uruguay for ‘respecting all Argentinians’ for not allowing HMS Gloucester into Montevideo. Unbelievably, Kirchner then went on to suggest that Argentina and Uruguay should form a ‘joint defence’ against Britain. If only Mrs. Kirchner would show some respect for the people who elected her by not patronising them.

“We know they are coming to exhaust our natural resources. They may come for the oil, they may come for the fish. They are after Argentina today, maybe they will be after Uruguay tomorrow if they feel they are lacking something up there. I appreciate the eternal solidarity Uruguay has showed towards the Malvinas (Falkland Islands). For this is a question that belongs to the whole of South America.”

I doubt very much whether, in real terms, the rest of South America is bothered about the Falkland Islands – this is just powerplay. Argentina have only started making a big deal out of the issue since the discovery of oil reserves in the area, and economic problems in Argentina. The Malvinas issue is being used for domestic reasons, which is not only offensive to the people in Argentina but also the Falklands. The idea of Britain being an agressor ‘after Uruguay tomorrow’ is ridiculous – history tells us where the agression comes from. The sad fact is that if a British minister were to talk like that there would be hell to pay.

On the one hand we might wonder why HM Government has not said anything about this, but its probably better not to dignify such posturing otherwise we would get tangled up in a real mess. There is a problem with third and second world countries pleading to be taken seriously, but still behaving like bannana republics.

But… again, with such chest-beating emanating from Buenos Aires, will the ConDem Government still go ahead with their plans to decimate the armed forces, and abandon all ability to defend the British citizens on the Falklands. The Argentine Government is probably watching the Strategic Defence Review more closely than the British public. And lets remember, Argentina is currently negotiating with France to purchase a Landing Ship. It doesn’t take too much to work out what Argentina would like to use it for…

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HMS Gloucester barred from Uruguay

HMS Gloucester docked on Portsmouth harbour.

HMS Gloucester in Portsmouth Harbour (Image via Wikipedia)

According to today’s Portsmouth News HMS Gloucester has been barred from calling in at a Uruguayan port.

The Type 42 Destroyer, on her way to the South Atlantic for her stint as Falkland Islands Guardship, had originally been granted permission to stop in Montevideo for supplies and fuel, as Royal Navy warships in the South Atlantic have frequently done for decades. When Gloucester arrived in Montevideo last week, however, she was informed that she was not welcome and asked to leave. An anonymous Uruguayan source even referred to the Falklands as the ‘Malvinas’.

Argentina had previously requested that all South American countries refuse to allow British warships or aircraft to use their facilities, in an attempt to blockade British Forces and make their job much more difficult. In 2007 HMS Nottingham was also barred from Montevideo, while also heading to the Falklands. On that occasion a specific request was made by the Argentinian Foreign Minister. Apparently that was not the case with HMS Gloucester. The barring of ports in South America is a very serious issue. In 1982 Argentina was a virtual pariah, as a military dictatorship. Although most countries did not give Britain open support (apart from perhaps Chile), neither did they support Argentina.

In the past year or so Argentina has been slowly ratcheting up pressure over the Falklands, brought to a head by the discovery of oil reserves in the South Atlantic near the Falklands. Funnily enough they were not so bothered about them until oil was discovered. I’ve written before about my views on the Falklands. British soveriegnty of the islands is something of an oddity of empire, but its by no means the only one - after all, most of the continent of South America is populated by – and ruled by – people who originally came from Spain. What happened to the indigenous people there? Yet the Falklands had no native population. The British people there now have been living there for hundreds of years, which in anyones book, makes them pretty settled. The arguments have been raked over over and over again. If there are issues, they should be raised in the United Nations.

The parallels with 1982 are rather alarming. An unpopular Argentinian Government with economic and social problems, a Thatcherite British Government looking to slash British Armed Forces, a decision pending over a South Atlantic Ice Patrol Ship, and fears that the Royal Navy might lose Aircraft Carrier and Assault Ship resources. Against that background, a lack of support – and, indeed, ambivilence to Britain in South America – is something we could well do without.

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Latest Falklands News: naval encounter and sub deployment

Something new crops up regarding the latest Falklands crisis every day, so until the situation calms down I ‘m going to give a daily analysis of the news.

It has emerged that on 28 January HMS York, the Royal Navy’s South Atlantic guardship, intercepted an Argentinian Navy Corvette that was approaching the area where exploratory drilling has recently started. The Drummond, a veteran of the 1982 Falklands War, apparently made an ‘innocent navigation error’, 10 miles inside the oil exploration area. HMS York radioed across and ‘encouraged’ her to change course. This incident can be seen in two ways – either the Argentine Navy’s seamanship is very poor, or they are acting provocatively. Much as Soviet and now Russian jets test UK airspace, perhaps Argentin was hoping to provoke a flashpoint?

In other navalnews, the Royal Navy today confirmed that a submarine has been deployed to the South Atlantic. Normally Submarine deployments are kept secret, so this news will have been made public as a clear signal to Buenos Aires. In all likelihood it is a Nuclear Attack Submarine carrying torpedoes and Tomahawk cruise missiles. In 1982 the Black Buck Vulcan raids demonstrated to Argentina that British forces had the ability to strike at any point in Argentina. Only with Tomahawk there is much less risk and more precision. And the Argentine Navy will remember very well how after HMS Conqueror sunk the Belgrano their ships were virtually bottled up in port.

In political news Argentina’s Foreign Minister met today with the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon, to press for support over the Falklands issues. Although the Foreign Minister emerged from the meeting uttering the same soundbites as other Argentinian leaders have recently, there has been a telling silence from Ban and the UN. Hopefully he is far too clever and impartial to be drawn into what is essentially South American power-play politics.

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More bluff and bluster over Falklands

Reportedly Argentina is seeking a meeting with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, over the Falklands Oil crisis.

The Argentinian Government has been conducting an aggressive diplomatic offensive in recent days, every bit as aggressive as their 1982 invasion. To seek to talk to the UN Secretary-General rather than put the issue before the General Assembly or Security Council is underhand. The fundamental principle of the United Nations is self-determination, the right of people to choose their own form of Government. The people of the Falkland Islands choose to be British. Until the change their minds, to agigate against their wishes is aggression.

A summit of South American leaders urged Argentina and Britain to “renew negotiations in order to find in the shortest time possible a just, peaceful and definitive solution to the dispute”. Funnily enough, it was Argentina who walked out of negotiations, only to cause a fuss now that it suits her. Argentina’s track record over the Falklands cannot be ignored, even since 1982 there has been the shadow of Argentinian threats to regain the Islands. All the time these exist, how can negotiations take place?

Brazilian President Lula da Silva, normally one of South America’s more sensible leaders, excelled himself with “What is the geographic, the political or economic explanation for England [sic] to be in Las Malvinas? Could it be because England is a permanent member of the UN’s Security Council [where] they can do everything and the others nothing?” Aside from referring to the UK as England, and showing a Janet and John level of understanding of the relationship between the UK and the Falklands, Lula’s comments have more to do with Brazil’s desire to be seen as a serious world power herself. There is a reason why the UK is a permanent member of the Security Council – aside from a few notable examples (Suez and Iraq spring to mind) the UK has by and large been a force for good in the modern world.

As I have frequently commented, the effects of Empire are all over South America. Is President Lula feeling guilty about how his Portuguese ancestors came to Brazil? The British Empire no longer exists, and the UK Government clearly has no desire to ‘hold on’ to any territory that wants independence – witness the withdrawal from Empire post-1945, and the handing back of Hong Kong in 1997. Frankly, the attempt to whitewash Britain as an Imperial power does not wash.

The sad thing is, it seems that South America’s leaders are behaving more imperialistically than Britain has for many years. The Falklands issue has found itself hijacked by the bigger issues of South American power-play.

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Pressure builds over Falklands Oil

The discovery of huge oil reserves under the seas around the Falkland Islands has raised tensions between the UK and Argentina, according to the Sunday Express. Argentinian authorities have prevented a ship, the Thor Leader from leaving the port of Campana last Thursday. It was carrying a cargo of 7,000 tonnes of steel tubes to be used for drilling, which the Argentinian Government allege has been ‘illegally promoted’ by Britain.

Argentinian objections are believed to centre around UN resolutions which call for the two Governments to renew talks on sovereignty of the Islands. Quite how the Argentines can complain about this is interesting, as recently President Cristina Kirchner has vowed to regain the Islands. And in my opinion the UK Government is quite right in that as long as the Islanders themselves want to remain British, there is nothing to discuss. Therefore it is slightly mischievious of the UN to call for negotiations.

Geologists estimate up to 60 billion barrels could lie beneath the sea bed, potentially the second largest oilfield in the world. Argentina is facing an economic crisis, and ratcheting up pressure over the Falklands is an age old resort of Buenos Aires. It will not have gone un-noticed that British forces are severely stretched in Afghanistan, and the Royal Navy is much smaller than it was in 1982. The upcoming Defence Review is bound to cut the Armed Forces even further.

The Islands themselves are better protected than they were in 1982, with air defence missile systems, Typhoon Fighters, an infantry company and several Royal Navy vessels on station. But although the tripwire is stronger than in 1982, that the UK’s military’s forces are so much smaller are bound to have an impact on diplomacy.

That a signifcant oilfield is in UK sovereign territory has to be taken into account in the Defence Review, as Britain could not rely on international support should Argentina keep raising the pressure.

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