Category Archives: Royal Marines

How to Make a Royal Marines Officer (1989)

I’ve found this rather interesting programme on BBC iplayer showing the training of a group of Royal Marines officer trainees undertaking the Commando Commissioning Course at Lympstone.

It’s quite interesting to note the training for officers compared to men – more focus on initiative, not so many extreme bollockings but the same physical and mental tests. As one of the staff mentions, the idea is that the young officers who if they are comissioned will be commanding a platoon of 30 blokes, many of them older, can stand in front of their men and provide a good example and not be embarrased. It’s always intriguing to see the NCO’s staff berating the ‘young gentlemen’, calling them all kinds of things, suffixed with a ‘sir’. But every green beret in the Royal Marines will have done the same training.

I’ve always found the psychological aspect of military training pretty interesting, as it can apply to other fields and professions. The skills of leadership in particular are fascinating – how do you pick out a leader at 18 or 19, from the thousands of applicants? It’s entirely possible that from those humble beginnings, one of them might end up as a Major-General commanding the Corps.

The lad from Barbados attempting the Commando Course during winter in particular seems to have had a pretty tough time!

Click here to watch (UK only)

2 Comments

Filed under Royal Marines, videos

Band of HM Royal Marines – Abide with Me

Graduating musicians from the Royal Marines School of Music in Portsmouth play Abide with Me during the Graduation Beat Retreat in Portsmouth Guildhall Square yesterday. Abide with Me has always been a favourite hymn of mine, even though I am a bit of a heathen in religious terms!

4 Comments

Filed under Music, Royal Marines

Falklands 30 – The San Carlos Landings

 Three landing craft from HMS FEARLESS, contain...

In the case of the Falklands War, the British Task Force was attempting to dislodge an uninvited invader. In order to do so, the Argentine sea and air forces had to be worn down to a point at which British amphibious forces could land on the islands, and then defeat the Argentine land forces in battle.

Ordinarily, amphibious operations would only be attempted once a number of criteria were achieved. Firstly, air and sea superiority would have to be achieved, in order for friendly air and naval craft to protect the landing ships during their most vulnerable phase. Secondly, western military philosophy in 1982 suggested that offensive operations such as amphibious landings should not be undertaken unless the attacked had at least a numerical superiority of 3:1 over the defender.

In May 1982, the British task force had largely forced the Argentine fleet back into port after the sinking of the Belgrano, thus solving one potential headache. And although the task force had given a good account of itself in dealing with air attack – the Sea Harriers in particular proving to be more than a match for Argentine fighters – the British had not worn down enough of the Argentine air inventory to claim air superiority. The Falklands were within range of fast jets flying from the Argentine mainland. In addition, the task force only possessed a reinforced Brigade, of three Royal Marine Commandos and two Parachute Battalions. The Argentines on the Falklands, meanwhile, numbered Divisional strength – albeit comprised mostly of conscripts – and had had time to dig in.

The task force, however, was under considerable pressure to effect a landing on the Falklands. Any operation aimed at re-taking the Islands would, ultimately, require an amphibious landing. If international opinion turned against Britain and forced a ceasefire, then the proverb ‘possesion is nine tenths of the law’ might come into play. Hence, the politicians in London wanted a landing as soon as possible. Although the main Battlegroup of the task force had steamed into the waters around the Falklands earlier in May, the landing force had taken some time to assemble – in particular, the landing ship HMS Intrepid had been brought out of mothballs in Portsmouth Dockyard, and was the last piece of the jigsaw. As soon as she arrived, the landing could take place. Sandy Woodward was also conscious of the oncoming southern winter, which would add to the wear and tear on the task force – there was a limit to how long the ships could stay at sea fighting, and getting the war over with as soon as possible was a priority.

San Carlos, an inlet on the west coast of East Falkland, had been reconnoitred by Special Forces for weeks prior to the landings. It was accessed via the northern entrance of Falkland sound. It was around 60 miles from the capital Port Stanley, and considered ideal for a landing. It had direct access from the South Atlantic, and was in a sheltered water. There were plenty of landing beaches, and hills on the outskirts for the landing forces to dig in to in the event of a counter-attack. And crucially, it was believed that the Argentines were expecting a landing near Port Stanley. Heavily influenced by the American, direct strategy of attack, the Argentine’s expected the Marines and Paras to land on the beach outside of Stanley and leg it up Stanley High Street. But Stanley was heavily defended, and was garrisoned by thousands of Argentines. San Carlos, by contrast, had very few. In a classic example of Liddel-Hart‘s indirect approach, San Carlos was chosen as it would allow the land forces to gain a foothold and build up, before striking east.

Interestingly, it was not thought possible for any amphibious landing to succeed at San Carlos – according to to British pre-war plans, the US armed forces or the Argentines. Yet necessity virtually forced the British planners to choose San Carlos by default, after all other possibilities had been discounted.

Given that the landings were likely to come under air attack, air-defence was a key consideration. Woodward detached the two Sea Wolf Type 22 Frigates Broadsword and Brilliant, the Sea Dart armed Type 42 Destroyer HMS Coventry, and a force of Frigates and Destroyers to provide naval gunfire support. The landings would be led by the Landing Ships HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid, with their Landing Craft.

Intelligence suggested that there were very few Argentine troops in the area, which would give the British landing forces time to dig in and build up in preparation for an assault on Stanley. Despite this, there was naturally a sense of trepidation among the Marines and Paras preparing to land on D-Day. Would the Argentines subscribe to Rommel’s thoughts on amphibious landings, and attempt to throw the landings back into the sea in the first 24 hours?

12 Comments

Filed under Falklands War, Navy, Royal Marines, Uncategorized

Remember the Falklands @ Portsmouth Dockyard

Myself and the HSO (History Support Officer) have just got back from the ‘Remember the Falklands‘ event at the Dockyard in Pompey today. HMS Dragon and HMS York were open to visitors, providing a contrast between the 1982 vintage of Royal Navy ship, and the modern escort fleet.

HMS Dragon

HMS Dragon

HMS Dragon

Dragon is the newest of the Type 45 Destroyers to join the fleet, having only arrived in Portsmouth a matter of months previously. As I have previously commented after visiting Daring and Dauntless, the space on these ships is incredible compared to their earlier counterparts. It’s such a privilege to look round such a clean, tidy new-smelling ship. You know when you buy a new car, and for a few months it has that new smell? Well, Dragon still has that.

OK, who let a ginger in the ops room?

The ops room in particular is incredible, the sheer amount of desks and monitors is a sight to behold. You get the impression that the skill in commanding a modern warship is how the officers – and warrants and CPO’s for that matter – learn to control and process what goes in and out of that inner sanctum. One thing that occurs to me… I’ve been on three Type 45 Destroyers now, and never been allowed onto the bridge – what is on the bridge of a T45 that we aren’t allowed to see?

HMS York

HMS York

HMS York

HMS York is a batch 3 Type 42 Destroyer, one of the ships that was hastily redesigned after the lessons of the Falklands were digested. Longer than her earlier counterparts, she has a more pronounced bow for improved seakeeping, and distinctive strengthening beams down the side. I believe that she’s up for decomissioning in the next year or so. The difference between her and Dragon is striking – so much less room, so much more cramped, and overall looking very tired. The funny thing is, that we were allowed to see a lot more on York – including the 1970’s looking Ops Room (half the size of Dragon’s), the bridge, and also ratings and officers quarters. The crew were also remarkably informative and chatty. It’s always a phenomenon looking round warships – some ratings look bored out of their minds, whilst others seem to love spinning a yarn.

Sea Dart - never to be fired again?

Sea Dart – never to be fired again?

Other Sights

As per usual at these kind of events the band of Her Majesty’s Royal Marines played.

I also managed to get some good pictures of the new Up Harbour Ammunitioning Facility currently being constructed. The New UHAF is much closer to the Dockyard than before, not too far off the corner of Middle Slip and North Corner Jetties.

the new UHAF

the new UHAF

My conclusions about the day? I can’t stress enough how important these days are. The Royal Navy is notoriously bad at blowing its own trumpet and doing the PR thing. Everyone knows about the Eurofighter Typhoon thanks to the RAF’s PR department, but how many people are as aware of Type 45 Destroyers? The Royal Navy, if it want’s to be at the forefront of defence, needs to win hearts and minds at home as much as battles at sea.

26 Comments

Filed under Dockyard, event, Falklands War, Navy, out and about, Royal Marines

Operation Suicide: The Remarkable Story of the Cockleshell Raid by Robert Lyman

The ‘Cockleshell Heroes‘ raid is one of those operations that we all like to think we know everything about. Royal Marines, canoes, mines, Bordeaux, escaping. On the face of it, its a very daring escapade. But dig beyond the veneer of Hollywood history, and the story is even more fascinating and inspiring than it first appears.

Of course, being a Portsmouth bloke I’ve always been well aware of the Cockleshell Heroes. In fact, an ex-Bootneck down my mum and dads road was actually an extra in the film. Ah yes, the film. If you mention the Cockleshell Heroes, people think of a swarthy Mediterranean looking commander, an elderly second in command, and of brawling in Portsmouth pubs. Whilst the broad premise of the film was reasonably accurate, some of the names, personalities and suchlike were badly altered for whatever reason, and the background to the raid was not dealt with virtually at all.

What I found refreshing about this book is that Lyman has focussed more attention on the build up to the raid – its inspiration and genesis, and Hasler’s driving force behind it – than the actual raid itself. I think this is a smart move. To be honest – and as Lyman himself admits, C.E. Lucas-Phillips book of the 1950’s, written with the collaboration of Major Hasler, pretty much covered the raid itself very well.

The Cockleshell raid was not merely a case of sinking a few ships in occupied Europe. German ships had been attempting to break the Royal Navy’s blockade of Nazi-dominated Europe in an attempt to transport scarce raw materials between Germany and Japan and vice versa. Obviously, cutting off these blockade runners would seriously damage the Axis war effort. The Ministry of Economic Warfare targeted Bordeaux, and Combined Operations – led by Lord Louis Mountbatten – planned a daring raid.

One aspect that is often overlooked is how Hasler and Bill Sparks – the two sole survivors of the raid – made their escape from Bordeaux back to Britain. In terms of escape and evasion, the men were badly let down – they were not given the names of any French Resistance contacts, and only told, in the broadest terms, to head for a certain village. As Airey Neave of MI9 conceded after the raid, it was a terrific achievement for the men to make it home at all – via Ruffec, Lyon, Marseille, Barcelona, Madrid and Gibraltar.

Another mistake was the lack of co-ordination between Government and armed forces departments over raids. On the very morning that the limpet mines exploded, SOE operatives were on their way to the docks to plant bombs onboard the very same ships – both organisations were completely unaware of the others plans. If they had been able to work together, the damage might have been even more crippling on Germany.

I also like the manner in which Lyman has dealt with the very sensitive manner in which the remainder of the raiding party were executed by the Germans. In my experience, there is a wealth of documentation in official archives about war crimes, thanks to post-war investigations, and tragically it means that we can tell a lot about men who were killed in cold blood. Whilst writing about them might not be able to change history, at least their experiences might serve to remind us of why exactly they were fighting.

I enjoyed reading this book very much – it helped me through some very long train delays. And far more importantly, it achives the very difficult objective of shedding new light on a very-well known and intensely studied event in history.

Operation Suicide is published by Quercus Books.

8 Comments

Filed under Book of the Week, Royal Marines, Uncategorized, World War Two

Band Corporal Arthur Wood and Musician Frederick Wood

British battlecruiser HMS QUEEN MARY.

It never ceases to amaze me just what an impact the Battle of Jutland had on Portsmouth – three Portsmouth Battlecruisers were sunk, with the loss of thousands of men. Obviously, in such a strong naval city, many communities were badly hit. And with several generations of the same family often served at the same time, some family suffered more than one casualty. But one family I have researched paid a heavier price than most.

Arthur Oswald Wood, born in Worcester on 8 September 1892, enlisted in the Royal Marines Band Service on 20 September 1906. His brother Frederick William, who had been born in London on 23 September 1889, joined the Band Service on 15 March 1905. Their father was a retired warrant officer who had served in the Royal Field Artillery, and the family lived at 10 Kimberley Road in Southsea.

At the Battle of Jutland both were serving on board the Portsmouth-based Battlecruiser HMS Queen Mary, as part of the ship’s Royal Marine Band. Arthur Wood was the Band Corporal. Both were killed when HMS Queen Mary was sunk in the battle on 31 May 1916. Arthur was 23, and Frederick was 26. They are both remembered on the Portsmouth Naval Memorial on Southsea Common.

5 Comments

Filed under portsmouth heroes, Royal Marines, Uncategorized, World War One

Portsmouth’s WW1 Royal Marines

Having visited the Royal Marines Museum the other day to take a look at their ‘More than a Name’ exhbition, I thought I would follow it up by taking a look at what I have learnt about Portsmouth‘s Royal Marines of WW1.

The names of Royal Marines from Portsmouth who died between 1914 and 1921 are included in the Royal Navy panels on Portsmouth’s WW1 Cenotaph in Guildhall Square. So far I have processed and researched all of the Navy names from A up to M, so just over halfway and probably enough to start drawing some conclusions.

So far, 161 men from Portsmouth died serving with the various units of the Corps of Royal Marines in the Great War. 72 were Royal Marine Light Infantry, 68 were Royal Marine Artillery, 14 were Royal Marine Bandsmen, and 1 was a Royal Marine Engineer. 1 served in the RM Canteen Service, and one was an officer of as yet unknown origin.

As in WW2, most Marines were killed on sea service in ships. 12 Marines were killed in HMS Good Hope on 1 November 1914, 9 in HMS Bulwark on 26 November 1914, and a total of 30 at Jutland on 31 May 1916, in Black Prince, Invincible, Lion, Princess Royal, Queen Mary, Indefatigable and Defence.

9 were killed serving with the Royal Marine Howitzer Brigade on the Western Front, and 16 were killed serving with the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division (8 in France, 5 at Gallipoli, 2 in Britain, 1 in Belgium and 1 in Greece). One man, Private William Elliot of the RMLI, was killed serving in Northern Russia on 27 August 1919, during the Russian Civil War.

Thanks to the National Archives, we have information available for when Royal Marines enlisted in the Corps. And the findings are striking. Out of the 144 who we have enlistment dates for, only 18 joined up after the start of the war. In fact, 61 had enlisted when Queen Victoria was still on the throne. This suggests that the Royal Marine of 1914-18 was an older, experienced man, and that the Corps did not actually expand that much in wartime. Much as with the Royal Navy, its role in peace was almost as demanding as it was in war. Of course, the Corps had its own emergency manpower to fall back on, in the form of the Royal Marines Reserve. 12 RMR men were killed in action.

Out of those 18 who joined up post August 1914, four of them were killed serving with the Royal Naval Division. This would suggest that the RN Division was composed of a higher proportion of hostilities only men than ships detachments. As we might expect, a large proportion of Royal Marines were living in Southsea and Eastney, near to the Royal Marine Barracks. Of the 97 that we have age statistics for, 44 were aged 30 or over – the oldest at 51!

So whilst the British Army of 1914-18 was very much a wartime creation – particularly from 1915 onwards – the Royal Marines, and to an extent the Royal Navy by definition – were still very much a product of Victorian Society.

8 Comments

Filed under Royal Marines, western front, World War One