Category Archives: Navy

HMS Daring deploys to the Gulf

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HMS Daring, the first Type 45 Destroyer, deploys to the Gulf tomorrow. She is due to pass the Round Tower at 12.30pm, according to QHM Portsmouth. Replacing the Devonport based Type 23 Frigate HMS Argyll, she will be responsible for patrolling the Persian Gulf. Tensions have been rising in recent weeks, after Iranian naval exercises in the vital straits of Hormuz. The deployment has been seen in some quarters as inflammatory, yet the MOD insists that the deployment has been long-planned. Hence it could hardly be called a ‘show of force’, as the Telegraph is describing it.

This is the first time that one of the Type 45 Destroyers has embarked on an active deployment, and will be keenly watched by many, in Britain and worldwide. As much as I have criticised the cost and small number of ships in the Daring Class, they are fantastic ships by all accounts. Their anti-air missile system, Sea Viper, is among the most advanced in the world, and the SAMPSON radar is phenomenally powerful. They should prove to be more than a match for anything that the Iranians could throw at her in terms of aircraft or anti-ship missiles. It is only in terms of her own anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities that she is lacking. Mines might also be a concern, but there are considerable allied mine countermeasures forces in the Gulf, including HMS Ledbury who left Portsmouth yesterday.

Save The Royal Navy has highlighted a very amusing article in a nondescript website, that describes Daring as a ‘floating target’ for Iranian forces. Accompanied by a picture of a Batch 1 or 2 Type 42 Destroyer, the text is badly researched and in places laughable. The Iranian military might be increasingly large and belligerent, but their inventory is rather out of date.

The Straits of Hormuz are a critical choke point. The only maritime entrance to the Persian Gulf, a large amount of the world’s oil transits through the 34 mile wide straits – about 14 tankers pass through a day, carrying 15.5m barrells of crude oil. This represents 35% of the world’s seaborne oil shipments. Closure of the straits, or any significant problems, would starve the world of oil and create havoc on the global oil markets. During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 the US and British naval forces patrolled the Gulf, ensuring security for merchant vessels. The RN presence has continued ever since under the Armilla Patrol.

What the Royal Navy cannot afford is another incident like that that occured in 2007, when two RIB’s from HMS Cornwall were detained by Iranian patrol boats and the sailors and marines held captive by Tehran. Although it is difficult to argue with the fact that they could not have done much differently – shooting would have created a major international incident – it was bad seamanship to let themselves be captured in the first place. Although accusations of the Royal Navy ‘going soft’ are wide of the mark, pictures of sailors and marines being paraded in Tehran are hardly good for fighting reputation.

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Refighting the Falklands War (2012): The Reckoning

So, we’ve looked at the various elements that might constitute a re-run of the 1982 Falklands War – the political dimension; the naval war (Aircraft carriers, naval aviation, amphibious warfare, escorts, logistics, submarines); the air war; and the land battle.

I think the key points to emerge are as follows:

  • Lack of carrier-borne air cover MIGHT not preclude a succesful task force, but it would be useful
  • We have JUST enough amphibious capability to effect a landing if need be
  • We have some very high quality Destroyers and Frigates, but nowhere near enough of them
  • We are perilously short of auxiliaries, and would need much assistance from the Merchant Navy
  • Our submarines are very capable, but far too few
  • The four Typhoons at Mount Pleasant would be crucial
  • Any landing force would be battle-hardened, thanks to Iraq and Afghanistan
  • The Argentines forces, although more professional, are outclassed equipment wise

As we can see, there are a lot of ‘might’, ‘just’. Which is hardly ideal when planning to embark on a military operation. The theme that seems to emerge is that the British Armed Forces – in terms of inventory and personnel – are very high quality, but few in number. This situation is not likely to change any time soon, given the economic situation – in fact, it is likely to get worse before it gets better. And if future defence cuts prune back – salami slice – ship numbers, for example, then we would go beyond the point where an operation ‘might’ be possible, to a point where one would be foolhardy.

Politically, the Falklands/Malvinas issue is unlikely to disappear any time soon, and certainly not after the discovery of natural resouces in the seabed of the South Atlantic. The current Argentine President is continually spouting ‘route-one’ politics, ie fooling the population away from domestic problems by targetting an external bogeyman. The current period of South American love-in has also emboldened Kirchner, it seems. How long this might last is anyones guess, given the fickle nature of Latin American politics.

1982 taught us that signs of weakness, such as cutting vital and sometimes symbolic assets, can be the first domino in causing unsavoury types to play their hand. Any possible savings that might have been gained from retiring HMS Endurance in 1982 were completely dwarfed by the costs – human, financial and materiel – that were incurred after Argentina took it to be a launchpad for war. As such, cost-cutting can be short-sighted – cutting a ship might save a few million, but will it cost us much more in the long run? Defence does give traction on the world stage. It was this lack of co-ordination between defence and diplomacy that caused such problems in 1982.

Is it narrow-minded to think solely about the Falkland Islands? After all, history is full of examples of forces and leaders who prepared to fight the last war, only to find that they were hopelessly stuck in the past. Aside from extremist terrorism, and perhaps Iran in the straights of Hormuz, Argentine threats to the Falklands are the most serious threat to British interests today. And we would be sensible to plan accordingly. All the time the Falkland Islanders wish to remain British, we have a duty to defend them.

Also, we should be aware that any ignominious outcome in the Falklands would have big domestic and international repurcussions. If the Argentines were to reclaim the Falklands, what is to stop the Spanish applying pressure over Gibraltar? We might find that we also put other nations in sticky positions over their far-flung possessions. And for Britain to be defeated by a second-world state would be embarassing to say the least – losing wars and surrendering territories does nothing for your international standing. In 1982 the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact cannot have failed to note that the British Armed Forces punched very hard. Showing that you will not be pushed about will surely make other enemies think twice about having a pop.

In 2012 the Falklands could be defended, and retaken if necessary. Just.

 

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The Irish who fought for Britain

Apparently there is a programme on BBC Radio 4 in a few days time looking at the discrimination suffered by Irishmen from the Republic who fought for Britain during the Second World War. I never knew this, but apparently the Irish Government had a blacklist of men who had deserted from the Irish Republic‘s forces and joined the British Armed Forces. The discrimination reached quite far, down to all Government agencies. It must have been hell for many of the poor blokes to have to hide their past for 60 odd years. As somebody says on the programme, it is incredible that men who volunteered to fight fascism were persecuted far more than men who simply deserted and went on the run. Even men who died in action were still included on the list.

On the face of it, this policy isn’t surprising. Ireland in 1939 still had a decidedly anti-British chip on its shoulder, particularly in officialdom. Of course, Eamon de Valera was the only world leader to offer his condolences to Nazi Germany on Hitler’s death. The rationale for which, I have never understood. But to learn that the Government actually went as far as to have a blacklist of names, to the point of affecting men’s employment prospects, is rather startling.

To this day, Irish citizens have a unique status when it comes to applying to serve in the British Armed Forces. If anyone has looked at the entry requirements, they often specify ‘UK, Commonwealth or Irish’ nationality. But Irish recruitment into the Royal Navy and British Army, in particular, has been going on for hundreds of years. During the Napoleonic era legions of Irishmen served in Wellington’s Army – Sergeant Patrick Harper of the Sharpe novels, for example. My own Catholic Irish ancestry brought my family to Portsmouth, to join the Royal Navy. In 1914 my great-grandfather, Thomas Daly, journeyed from Birkenhead to Portsmouth to join the Royal Navy.

Interestingly, we can tell where WW1 sailors were born. 5 sailors out of 745 I have researched so far came from Ireland. This doesn’t include men who might be second generation immigrants. It is also noticeable that many Portsmouth servicemen died fighting with Irish Army units – the Royal Munster Fusiliers, in particular. In his many books Richard Doherty has charted the great contribution that Irishmen – from north and south of the border – made to the allied cause in the Second World War. And in the First World War, the Republican and Unionist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland put aside their differences and joined Divisions that included Protestant and Catholic men.

It seems to me that discrimination against Irishmen who fought Hitler was petty, and had more to do with an inherent anti-Britishness than any thoughts about the morality of the Second World War. When men have to hide medals that they earnt fighting against extremism and tyranny, its a very strange world indeed.

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Refighting the Falklands War (2012): Submarine warfare

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In 2009 I identified a serious risk of the Royal Navy losing a useful mass of numbers when it comes to submarines.

As in 1982, one would imagine that the Submarine service would be expected to shadow the Argentine fleet, and try to take out some of its inventory – in particular the Exocet equipped ships that might cause our surface vessels trouble. They would also be expect to loiter off the Argentine mainland watching for aircraft and shipping, to provide land strike capability, and also to slip ashore special forces.

The Astute Class are regarded as the best submarines in the world, perhaps on a par with the US Navy’s equivalent Virginia Class. According to one website, she is as quiet as a baby dolphin, which probably makes her as good as undetectable in skilled hands. And a submarine that cannot be detected can act with impunity. And knowing that British submarines can roam around the South Atlantic at will is bound to put the fear of god into Argentine naval officers.

The Astutes carry advanced sonar and weapons systems, more weapons than any other British submarine previously – Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles and Spearfish torpedoes. With a range of 1,240 miles, this means that Astute could accurately target sites in North Africa sitting off the South Coast of England. Such a range and sophistication really would cause severe problems to the Argentine forces. The only problem might be replenishment of Tomahawk stocks, both in terms of the US allowing us to purchase more, and then getting them to the South Atlantic. But as I identified in 2009, Tomahawk would provide a more accurate and less risky alternative to the Black Buck Vulcan raids.

In terms of slipping ashore Special Forces, I must confess I had always laboured under the impression that bigger SSN’s were not as ideal for the task of inshore work as the smaller, old diesel electrics where. After all, in 1982 HMS Onyx was sent south reputedly to work close inshore with special forces. Yet it seems that the new Astute Class boats will be able to use a piece of American technology, the Dry Dock Shelter (DDS). The DDS enables special forces teams to enter and exit the submarine much easier. As with much special forces and submarine technology specifications are hazy, but I can imagine the DDS being pretty useful.

The big problem – and this is the same as with Destroyers and Frigates – is that we simply do not have enough Submarines. By the time the Astute class are finished in 2024 – yes 2024, in 12 years time! – the RN will have seven SSN Submarines – critically short. Of course, as with any vessels a number of these will be in refit at any time. As the Astute class boats are commissioned – at a rate of one every two or three years – the Trafalgar Class will decommission, with the Navy maintaining a level of seven SSN’s in service. Of course, there is a strong possibility that the Trafalgars might start falling apart long before then.

The problem with Submarine procurement, is that with the political desire to ‘buy British’, there is only really one option – BAE Systems yard at Barrow. In order to maintain a healthy programme of orders and ensure that a skilled workforce and facilities can be maintained, submarine procurement and constructions works on a ‘drumbeat’ policy – stretching out orders to ensure that there are no quiet periods when workers would have to be laid off. With the MOD looking at renewing the nuclear deterrent SSBN’s by the mid 2020′s, the building programme for the Astutes has been stretched to cover until when work is due to begin on the SSBN replacements. All very well, but according to the National Audit Office this delay will cost more, to the point at which if the boats had been built faster an eighth Astute could have been built. The MOD decided against this, however, no doubt fearful of the running costs of operating another boat.

Obviously, due to their nature it is very difficult to find out too much about submarine deployments, or submarine technological specifications. But if it is true, that an Astute can watch shipping from off the North American coast, then even one Astute in the South Atlantic could provide a wealth of intelligence without actually firing its weapons. And that is actually the beauty of submarines – you don’t know where they are, so you have to assume that they could be anywhere and could strike at any time - a real hinderance on your freedom of operations if you are an Admiral looking to take and defend the Falkland Islands.

In 1982 the Task Force deployed 5 SSN’s of the Churchill, Valiant and Swiftsure Classes, and one diesel electric Oberon class Boat. In 1982 the RN was geared up for submarine warfare in the North Atlantic, and hence had a considerable submarine arm, in terms of numbers and experience. In 1982 the Royal Navy had 11 SSN’s to chose from, and no less than 13 Oberon Class conventional boats. 24 boats, whilst in 2012, we would be able to choose from 7 at the most.

A theme is emerging – a Royal Navy with first class assets, but with not nearly enough of them.

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Refighting the Falklands War (2012): Auxiliaries and Merchant vessels

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In 2009 I looked at the role of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the Merchant Navy. But since then, it has occured to me that their roles are so similar and interlinked that it makes much more sense to look at them in unison.

The RFA of 2012 is woefully small. Even when we consider that the Royal Navy has contracted in size, the RFA has shrunk beyond proportion to that contraction. It can only field:

It should be noted that I have excluded the Bay Class LPD’s, which rightfully belong under ‘Amphibious Warfare’. This is absolutely microscopic when compared to the RFA effort that was required in 1982. In 1982 the RFA utilised:

  • 10 Tankers of four different classes
  • 2 Fort Class replenishment ships
  • 1 Helicopter Support ship
  • 2 Ammunition store ships
  • 1 Ness Class store ship

In addition, the Merchant Navy provided a very sizeable contribution to the logistics effort, and ships taken up from trade and chartered consisted of the following:

  • 9 troopships (to lift two brigades)
  • 4 aircraft/helicopter support ships
  • 1 ammunition ship
  • 1 general transport ship
  • 14 Oil Tankers
  • 1 Water Tanker
  • 2 Ocean going tugs
  • 1 mooring vessel
  • 2 repair ships
  • 3 Refrigerated stores ships
  • 1 hospital ship
  • 2 despatch vessels
  • 1 minesweeper support ship

I have been having a bit of trouble getting access to any kind of information of what ships comprise the Merchant Navy in the present day. Bearing in mind the kind of effort it took to maintain a task force in the South Atlantic 30 years ago, a logistical effort would probably be required on a similar kind of level. If such ships could not be requisitioned from British flagged companies, ships would have to be chartered – at considerable cost. It is surely never ideal to be chartering ships to take to war.

With the shrinking of the RFA, gaps exist for tankers and general store ships. The six Point Class roll-on roll-off ships could provide a very useful capability of lifting vehicles, equipment, stores and possibly aircraft if needed. RFA Argus could be utilised as a helicopter support ship, and given the utility of the repair ship RFA Diligence, it would seem that similar repair support would be invaluable, given that Diligence has also acted very usefully as a depot ship for submarines and minesweepers in the past. Any vessels – perhaps container ships – that could be quickly converted to transport and operate helicopters would be most useful. Liners and medium to large ferries would be needed as troopships, and if Argus was used for helicopter support another option would be needed for providing hospital ship(s).

There is a serious lack of Tankers in the RFA. With only two Wave Class Fleet Tankers, two smaller Rover Class Tankers and one Leaf Class support tanker, the ability to replenish ships at sea is very minimal indeed. Even then, often the Wave Class ships have been sent on patrol duties, intercepting drug smugglers and pirates and the like. Whilst large commercial tankers could be requisitioned or chartered, it remains to be seen how many of them could replenish ships at sea.

Presumably the Task Force would have use of Ascenscion Island as a staging post. The airfield at Wideawake has been used as RAF Ascencion Island since the War as part of the air bridge between the UK and the South Atlantic. Although Ascencion does not have a harbour, it does provide the only sheltered anchorage en-route to the Falklands. The construction of an aiport on Saint Helena, due for completion in 2015, would radically improve transport links with the South Atlantic. Hence Saint Helena could also be used as a logistics hub. I would be very surprised if the MOD has not leaned on DfID to ensure that St Helena Airport is not capable of supporting military operations if necessary.

Histories of the Falklands War suggest that the Ministry of Defence maintains a list of merchant ships suitable for use in the time of war. In 1982, it was found that many of these were light, cross-channel ferries totally unsuitable to sailing 8,000 miles to the South Atlantic. One would hope that the MOD has a similar list maintained in readiness for a future Falklands War, as it looks like any Task Force would be impossible without a significant Merchant Navy contribution. From a logistical sense, getting a Task Force to the South Atlantic and keeping it there would be of prime importance.

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Refighting the Falklands War (2012): Frigates and Destroyers

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In my 2009 review of the possibility of fighting another Falklands War, I identified a lack of escorts – Frigates and Destroyers – as a critical problem that might inhibit Britain’s ability to retake the Falklands after a hypothetical Argentine invasion.

In order to assess whether the Royal Navy has a suitable number of hulls, we need to assess what tasks Frigates and Destroyers are needed to perform. I can think of the following off the top of my head:

The Technology

In 1982 the type 42 Destoyers were used as up-front radar pickets ahead of the main force. It was in this role that HMS Sheffield was sunk by an Exocet Missile, whilst acting as a radar picket along with her sister ships HMS Coventry and HMS Glasgow. The Type 965 air surveillance radar carried by the Type 42‘s in 1982 had a reasonable range of 230 nautical miles, but was becoming obsolescent and was due to be replaced by the more advanced Type 1022 system with a range of 225 nm. But using their radars three ships could still provide a reasonable radar screen, ahead of the main force. True, HMS Sheffield was hit, but that was partly due to her radar being ineffective at an unfortunate moment, and in addition, better to lose a destroyer than a carrier.

Fast Forward to 2012, and the Royal Navy has three Type 45 Destroyers in commission having passed all sea trials, with another – HMS Dragon – due to be commissioned in Spring 2012. The Type 45′s use a SAMPSON air surveillance radar, far in advance of anything that the Royal Navy possessed in 1982. It has been reported that SAMPSON is so effective, that in exercises with the US Navy a Type 45 Destroyer was asked to switch it off as it was ‘inhibiting training’. Specifications for SAMPSON are hard to come by, the best I can find is a range of 400 kilometres, which translates to around 250 miles. But apparently the picture is much more detailed, the false-alarm ratio is much lower, and it is all-round more effective.

In 1982 the Royal Navy could only deploy two of its new Type 22 Class Frigates, carrying Sea Wolf close range missile system. Both of these carried the original GWS-25 conventional launch system, fired using type 967/968 radar combinations. The rest of the Task Force’s Frigates and Destroyers were only armed with obsolete Sea Slug and Sea Cat systems. The Royal Navy’s Type 23 Frigates now fire vertical launch Sea Wolf, controlled by Type 996 radar. A combination of SAMPSON/Sea Viper and Type 996/VLS Sea Wolf is far in advance of what could be offered in 1982, especially when we consider that the Argentine Navy and Air Force’s equipment has hardly improved.

In an ironic sense, the likely lack of an aircraft carrier would release a couple of escort vessels from air defence duties, although the same role would still need to be performed escorting the amphibious group, or any other valuable or vulnerable group of ships in the Task Force. In a similar manner, ships would have to provide initial air defence for any invasion and subsequent landing zone, before Rapier could become effective – much as in 1982.

One problem I identified back in 2009 was the presence in the Argentine fleet of 13 Excoet equipped Destroyers and Frigates. One would hope that the advanced Type 45 and Type 23 technology would prove to be more than a match for this – and any Exocet equipped Super Etendards – but it does show up a shortcoming in anti-surface capability in the Royal Navy today. Exocet has a range of 43 miles, or 110 if fitted with a booster. This should be well within the range of SAMPSON in the long reach and Type 996 in the short distance, but do we have enough ships to provide defence against so many possible threats? However, since 1982 all RN ships DO have improved Close in weapons defences – be it Goalkeeper, Phalanx or Chaff.

The Type 23 Frigates carry Harpoon anti-surface missiles, which have a range of up to 136 miles, depending on which variant is carried (which I am struggling to find out). Hence Harpoon seems to outrange Exocet by some distance, but following the withdrawal of the Batch 3 Type 22 Frigates, there are only 13 Type 23′s in service. Not all of them would be available at any one time thanks to standing commitments and refits, and when we consider that at least a couple would be required for close-in air defence, only a few at most would be available for forming a surface-action group to combat the Argentine Exocet ships. The Typ3 45 Destroyers are designed to carry Harpoon as an upgrade – there is even space in the ops room for the operators desk – but they do not currently carry them. With the decomissioning of the four Batch 3 Type 22′s, I wonder if their Harpoon launchers and systems could be utilised? The the MOD would only need to purchase two new systems. It depends if the Type 22′s are to be scrapped or sold as going concerns.

The Argentine Navy does have a paucity of Submarines compared to 1982, fielding only three diesel electrics of TR-1700 and Type 209 class. If the performance of the Argentine submarine arm in 1982 is anything to go by, the Royal Navy need not fear too much. The Royal Navy has an expertise in anti-submarine warfare, a legacy of the Cold War. However, of the 13 Type 23 Frigates, only a number of them actually carry towed-array sonars for anti-submarine work – this could be something of a problem. All Frigates or Destroyers carry Merlin or Lynx helicopters for ASW, which one should imagine would provide good defence against submarines. However, the lack of an aircraft carrier might inhibit the carrying of further ASW Sea Kings as in 1982. In the same manner, a lack of AEW might be a problem.

In terms of naval gunfire support, the Royal Navy learnt a big lesson in 1982 – you can never have too many ships with a traditional main gun. As a result the Type 22 Class was modified to carry a 4.5 inch gun, and the Type 23 and Type 45 Classes all have the up to date Mark 8 4.5 inch gun. At Navy Days 2009 I was informed that the 4.5 inch gun direction actually has an offset built in, as in the Falklands it was found that the fire was too accurate – pretty much putting roundsi nto the same holes. Obviously for harrassing fire this is no good. A Task Force in the South Atlantic should be able to provide reasonable gun fire support, but a lack of Tomahawk LAM equipped surface ships is lamentable – although these are carried on our SSN’s, more of them on surface ships would really put the fear up the Argentines.

The verdict

Technologically, the Royal Navy has progressed in leaps and bounds since 1982, and can offer up radar and weapon systems that should more than prove a match for anything it might encounter in the South Atlantic. The only problem I can identify is a lack of hulls. With advances in technology, the number of ships keeps getting cut to subsidise the improved systems on each hull. With Four Type 45 Destroyers, three Type 42′s, and 13 Type 23′s, that gives only 20 Escort vessels in total. We would do very well indeed to get ten or twelve of them into action for a task force. Whilst one Type 45 Destroyer could probably do the job of two Type 42′s, if it is hit, it can’t do the job of any. A ship can only be in one place at any one time, and hence the politicians and admirals boasts that advances in technology make a lack of ships irrelevant should be treated with caution.

Ggiven that the Argentine Air Force and Navy haven’t really progressed since 1982, I wouldn’t imagine that any Type 45′s or Type 23′s down south would encounter too many problems. The problem would be getting enough of them there in the first place to do everything that we would need them to do. In recent months the RN has struggled to have ONE escort available in coastal waters alone. It could indeed be a close run thing once wear and tear and possible losses come into play.

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Petty Officer Percy Kempster DSM

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Having been researching twelve australian great war soldiers who lie in Portsmouth, little did I expect to come across a Portsmouth-based naval rating who died whilst serving with the Royal Australian Navy.

Percy John Kempster was born in Southampton, on 24 October 1883. Kempster initially joined the Royal Navy at the age of 16, in 1899. In late 1907 Percy married his wife Beatrice, in Portsmouth. After completing his service with the Royal Navy – including service on submarines at HMS Dolphin – Kempster joined the Royal Australian Navy on 24 October 1913, for an initial period of 5 years. Upon joining the RAN he was immediately promoted to Leading Seaman, and passed for eventual promotion to Petty Officer in due course.

It seems that Kempster’s main task upon joining the RAN was to form part of the crew delivering Australia’s first submarines. HM Submarines AE1 and AE2 were built at Vickers, and accepted by the Australian Navy at Portsmouth in February 1914. They finally left Portsmouth on 2 March 1914, escorted by the Light Cruiser HMS Eclipse. They finally arrived in Sydney Harbour on 24 May 1914, an epic voyage on such small, cramped vessels. After his arrival in Australia Kempster came under the command of HMAS Penguin, an ex Royal Navy sloop being used as a Submarine Depot ship.

Whilst Kempster was in Australia the First World War began. Obviously unhappy at being thousands of miles away from the action, after completing such an epic voyage Kempster returned to Britain. How exactly is unclear, but on 1 January 1915 he came back under the command of the RAN’s London Depot, serving in Royal Navy submarines. British and colonial personnel often interchanged on postings. Hence it is not a surprise that Kempster fought in the Royal Navy, even though he was technically an Australian rating.

On 20 January 1916 Percy Kempster was promoted to Petty Officer, and on 10 August 1917 he was appointed a Submarine Coxon – a key job on such small and demanding vessels. For service on HM Submarine G8 he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, announced in the London Gazette on 2 November 1917, for ‘services in action with enemy submarines’. Early submarines were much smaller than their modern equivalents – the G Class only having a crew of 31 men.

Sadly, Kempster did not survive the end of the war. On 14 January 1918 HM Submarine G8 was lost in the North Sea. The exact cause of her loss remains unknown. Petty Officer Percy Kempster is remembered on the Plymouth Naval Memorial. He was 34. At the time of his death his unit was given as HMS Lucia, a Royal Navy submarine ship. His wife Beatrice was living at 180 Fratton Road in Portsmouth.

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The Falklands Then and Now… AND Now: initial thoughts

Soon after starting my blog, I ran a series looking at the 1982 Falklands War. As a long-term resident of Portsmouth I have always had a very strong interest in the conflict, and wanted to do something of an annual ‘Open University Lectures’ style series over Christmas to give us all something to do. I didn’t really expect anyone to read it, but thanks to a plug from Mike Burleson (proprietor of the now-ceased New Wars blog) things snowballed and my hit ratings have never quite been the same since!

Much has changed in two years In the winter of 2009 we were looking ahead to a closely fought general election, under the spectre of a massive economic crisis. In the years since we have seen a new Government, a swingeing Defence Review which has radically altered the picture of British defence planning and capability. No strike Carrier, No Harriers, half the amphibious ships, less escorts, less everything really. Since 2009 tensions have also arisen with Argentina pulling various diplomatic strings to unsettle the British presence in the South Atlantic. Coincidentally, since the discovery of oil reserves in the South Atlantic.

With much change since then, and also with the 30th Anniversary of the war coming up next year, I think it is the ideal time to revisit the ‘Falklands: Then and Now’ series. Over christmas and the new year period I will be re-examining my original conclusions, and trying to find some sort of assesment as to how the Falklands War might feasibly be re-fought in 2012.

In 2009 I looked at the following:

  • Aircraft Carriers
  • Amphibious
  • Escorts (Destroyers and Frigates)
  • Submarines
  • Auxiliaries
  • Merchant Navy
  • Land Forces
  • The Air War
  • Command and Control
  • The Reckoning

If there is anything that I should add, or if anyone would like to make suggestions, please feel free to comment or email me via the ‘Contact Me’ bar above. If anybody would like to guest on any of the sections, please feel free to get in touch.

As I’m sure you can see, it is very sea-orientated, but then again as the Falklands are Islands 8,000 miles way then that is always bound to be the case. I remember also getting some pretty snobby comments in the past, about it being ‘hardly rocket science’. Well, that’s exactly the point – we need ordinary people to support our military, and we won’t do that by getting excited about the screws securing the sprockets in a Sea Wolf missile’s motor.

Suffice to say, only the most deluded of commentators will find this a positive exercise, but it is an opportune time to assess the declining state of Britain’s defence capabilities, and to use a historical yardstick to illustrate how we are incapable of defending those who wish to live under British citizenship.

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Engineer Lieutenant Joseph House DSC

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I’ve often written that naval officers, as a general rule, do not seem to either come from Portsmouth or live there. Lieutenant-Commander William Hussey DSO DSC is obviously an exception from the Second World War.

But I have come across a rather distinguished officer from Portsmouth who, although he did not die during the Great War ‘proper’, was decorated for bravery at Jutland, and was killed in anti-Bolshevik operations in the Gulf of Finland in 1919.

Joseph Alfred House was born in Southampton on 22 June 1879. House actually joined the Royal Navy in the ranks, serving as an Artificer Engineer earlier in his career. He joined the battlecruiser HMS Princess Royal in November 1913, and was present when she was in action at Heligoland Bight in 1914, Dogger Bank in 1915 and Jutland in 1916. At Jutland she received numerous hits, and suffered casualties of over 100 men, many of them from Portsmouth.

For bravery at Jutland, Joseph House was recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross. House’s DSC was announced in the London Gazette on 15 September 1916:

When the ship was hit and badly damaged, he efficiently made repairs to pipes under very difficult circumstances of smoke and darkness, whereby fires were got under control which otherwise must have been a very grave danger.

In October 1917 House was drafted to HM Submarine P17. After being promoted to Engineer Lieutenant he was posted to the Destroyer HMS Verulam. The Verulam hit a mine in the Gulf of Finland on 3 September 1919, and was sunk in two minutes. Only eight bodies were washed ashore, of which three were identified – one of those being House’s. He is buried in Styrssud Point War Cemetery, on a hill among pinewoods a quarer of a mile from the sea.

House’s medals – Distinguished Service Cross, 1914-15 Star, British War and Victory Medals – were auctioned at Dix Noonan and Webb in December 2007. With a guide price of £3500-£4000, they went under the hammer at £4,500.

I must confess I had always thought that the DSC was an officers award, but it seems that in some cases it was awarded to warrant officers who performed particularly bravely at sea. Reaching Warrant rank and earning a DSC at Jutland obviously earnt house his full commission in due course.

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USS Miami

Spotted coming into Portsmouth this afternoon. USS Miami, a Los Angeles class nuclear powered attack submarine of the US Navy.

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The inaugural Portsmouth Airshow launched

 

A Royal Air Force Avro Vulcan Display Team Vul...

Vulcan - coming to Portsmouth? (Image via Wikipedia)

Next year over the weekend of 18 and 19 August, the skies above Portsmouth will play host to up to seven hours of air displays. Sandwiched between the London Olympics and the Paralympics, it’s shaping up to be a fantastic occasion. It should be a huge draw, and great for Portsmouth. And best of all, it will be completely free to the general public!

 

The organisers are in the process of assembling an impressive array of participants. Already confirmed are a De Havilland Sea Vixen and the Breitling Wing Walkers. The organisers are also in talks with the Vulcan Bomber, various Spitfires and a Hawker Hunter. From the RAF the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight, Eurofighter Typhoon, Tornado, Tucano and a Jet Provost have been invited. The Red Arrows have also been applied for, although given recent events they are grounded and their 2012 schedule will not be confirmed until February. The Royal Navyhave also been asked to provide displays, and in terms of foreign assets the French Air Force display team and the Swiss aerobatic team are also in discussion, and these kind of rarities are the icing on the cake of the airshow circuit. Two parachute display teams have also been invited, from the RAF and the Royal Navy. In many cases the organisers have actually been approached by teams wanting to display.

 

But it’s not just about what is going on in the skies. Southsea Common will be alive with events, including a Family village, retail and merchandise areas, a food village, craft village, business and enterprise areas and corporate hospitality. Of course Southsea Seafront, with its panoramic views, historic setting and naval heritage, is perfect for such an event. And in a real treat, there will be a pop concert on the Saturday evening – including a Queen tribute act! – and a firework display finale. A field gun competition between the Royal Navy and Royal Marines is also a possibility.

 

The idea is that this will become an annual event, and the organisers Maurice and Steve are very keen to make sure that it is a sustainable event, on a firm business footing. In the words of Steve, it should have a real ‘Goodwood’ atmosphere. There are plenty of opportunities for sponsorship and corporate hospitality. The organisers are also on top of the game thinking about transport – park and ride will be an option in getting to and from the seafront for the festival.

 

Whats more, the event is not-for-profit, and will be to benefit some very appropriate charities – the Royal Navy and Royal Marines Charities, The Army Benevolent Fund and the Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund. The event will also support the Exercise Tiger Trust, raising awareness of a tragic event at Slapton Sands in Devon prior to D-Day in 1944.

 

I absolutely applaud Maurice, Steve and everyone involved. It has taken a massive amount of work to get this far, and they are to be congratulated. I wish them all the best. Lets all get behind it and give ourselves yet another reason to be proud of Portsmouth.

 

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HMS Belfast airbrushed out of Olympic Posters

Preserved Royal Navy cruiser HMS Belfast in th...

HMS Belfast - airbrushed (Image via Wikipedia)

This is a pretty strange one – its transpired today that HMS Belfast, moored on the Thames near Tower Bridge, has been airbrushed out of an official poster for the London 2012 Olympics.

We’ve had the usual ‘it was a mistake, blah blah’ statements from un-named spokesperson. But lets look at the facts. At some point, someone somewhere, made a conscious and deliberate decision that it would be a good idea to remove a historic warship from a scene of London. This isn’t something that you do accidentally – as anyone with design experience knows, doctoring a landscape is not something that ‘just happens’. I could understand some spotty young designer maybe brushing it out, but for it to pass so many levels up until publication without being halted, is pretty alarming.

What we need to think about, wider than the fact that it happened, is the thought process that led to it being acceptable? HMS Belfast has been moored on the Thames for over 40 years now, and has been visited by millions of people. If it wasn’t for the role of HMS Belfast in the war, we would have had plenty more Olympics like those in Berlin in 1936 – ie, a farce. Or football teams having to give the Nazi salute, like the teams who played in the World Cup in Germany in 1938. It’s not just ‘a ship’, it represents all of the ships of the British Royal Navy that have fought in bloody conflicts over hundreds of years.

Is it that military history is not thought appropriate for the Olympics? Well, in that case you can also airbrush out the Tower of London. Oh, and the Tower Hill Merchant Navy Memorial. And can anyone remember the spectacle of the Chinese Army soldiers goose-stepping with the Olympic flag in Beijing in 2008? That was hardly subtle, yet somehow that was overlooked. Don’t expect to see Grenadier Guards at the 2012 opening ceremony, or the Red Arrows flying overhead (although after recent events that might not be possible in any case).

I do wonder if it is down to a modern, lefty kind of school of thought, that would like to try and airbrush wars and anything military out of history. No doubt with the sobriquet that we ‘need to look to the future’. Well, without those who secured our past, there wouldn’t be much of a future to look forward to. I guess its the problem with having elected and appointed leaders with no sense of history.

It’s yet another example of just how blind this country and its institutions can be about our naval heritage. And if we’re that blase about the past, is it any wonder that the Royal Navy is struggling for attention in the present?

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Thoughts on the Fleet Ready Escort

HMS Somerset of the Royal Navy. Type 23 frigat...

A Type 23 Frigate, often on Fleet Ready Escort (Image via Wikipedia)

There’s been a lot in the papers recently about the fact that the Royal Navy has not had a Frigate or Destroyer designated as the Fleet Ready Escort for the past four weeks or so. But what exactly is the Fleet Ready Escort? It is usually a Frigate or Destroyer, maintained at high-readiness in UK waters to respond to events anywhere in the world. The idea presumably being that if a crisis kicks off somewhere, we can at least get ONE ship there quickly, and the most utilitarian of ships at that. If we need to augment the deployment, add ships, roulement, etc, then we can deal with that in time. FRE could be referred to as the first domino.

A clear example of this is the manner in which during the Callaghan Government of the late 1970′s, a Frigate was despatched. A Submarine and RFA soon followed. Sending a Frigate might be largely symbolic in a lot of cases, given the time that it will take to actually reach a crisis zone. But it is a statement of intent, that we can and will respond. If it is commonly known that we have no means of response, then rogue elements around the world know that they can act with impunity. It doesn’t take a genius to work out that if they can read Janes and see that our ability to respond is somewhere between unlikely and impossible, it must have at least crossed Argentina’s mind that if the Royal Navy does not have one Frigate spare in British waters, how the hell could it send a Task Force 8,000 miles south?

Therefore, that the Royal Navy has been without an FRE for any length of time is a cause of concern. It certainly is an indication that the fleet is far too stretched to fulfil all of its commitments adequately. Defending the realm and responding to the Government’s Foreign policy needs are surely the primary role of the Royal Navy? If they cannot be met, then why not? It’s hardly rocket science, but you can’t keep cutting ships without affecting capability. One expects that if something happened that required a response we would have to scrape the barrell and pull a ship out of refit, or off of exercises. We could probably cope, but ‘cope’ is not a very confidence-inspiring word.

One aspect in which I do think the role of FRE has been overstated is that of terrorism in UK waters. With the best will in the world, enough has been written here and elsewhere online to show that against seaborne terrorist tactics, such as small boats, Frigates and Destroyers are far from ideal. In any case, if you are looking to respond AFTER a terrorist incident, then it is already too late – the perpetrators will either have made away, or been vaporised along with their explosive-packed RIB. Smaller patrol craft, such as those employed by the SBS, would be far more suitable.

Neither is there any credible need to have a warship available to defend British waters in the conventional sense. All of our neighbours in Europe are friendly, and there are no antagonists anywhere near our seaboards who are likely to send a Battle Group up the western approaches any time soon. In any case, one expects if they did, we would know about it with plenty of notice. We are living in a different world from that of Jutland or Operation SeaLion.

In a similar manner to the FRE, the Army usually has an infantry Battalion on short notice to go anywhere in the world, and the RAF has assets on high-readiness, in particular fighters to intercept aircraft nosing into our airspace. When it comes down to it, all British servicemen and and defence materiel are on some level of readiness to go anywhere in the world should it be deemed necessary. If one ship is at high-readiness, what are the rest of them at? In the same manner, I guess, we have got used to roulements, with ships/units etc only being deployed for around 6 months at a time. This is obviously a ‘luxury’ or peacetime punctuated by low-intensity operations, whereas during total war, everyone is in the front line for the duration.

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Final design of Type 26 Frigate unveiled

Today’s Portsmouth News carries an article showing what is believed to be a posssible final design for the Royal Navy’s new Type 26 Frigates.

Apparently the ships are to displace 5,000 tons, will have a top speed of 28 knots, and will have a rear cargo door for launching small boats. They will be crewed by 140 sailors, compared to 180 for the current Type 23 Frigates. The cost is understood to be £400m per vessel – at the moment, the cost will probably skyrocket once BAE systems get to work. BAE hope to start work in 2016, and launch the first ship in 2018. They are needed urgently, as the Royal Navy has prematurely decomissioned its four Type 22 Frigates, and the Type 23′s are ageing rapidly.

The News ‘understands’ that 13 of them are to be built, with eight being based in Portsmouth and five in Plymouth. Expect bleatings from Plymouth based media and politicians forthwith. Of the current 13 Type 23 Frigates, seven are based in Plymouth and six in Portsmouth. Of course, one wonders exactly how many we will get – with almost a decades worth of recession defence budgets to go through, and potentially one or more defence reviews, we will be very lucky to get ten or more.

Notice also that talk of C1, C2 and C3 versions has fallen by the wayside – it seems that we will be getting thirteen identical ships, for cost reasons no doubt. Let’s hope that the Type 26 is more succesful in the export market than some of our more recent shipbuilding efforts. Partnerships have been rumoured with Australia, Brazil and Turkey.

I’m struggling to find much more information, apart from the News article and the relevant page on the Royal Navy website. If anyone finds anything else, I would be very grateful for some links. In particular, I’m sure we would all like to know about weapons systems and electronics. According to the RN web page, they look like carrying a 4.5inch main gun, some kind of vertical launch missile system, a couple of Goalkeeper-looking CIWS, and a very large helicopter pad and hangar. Apart from that, a very clean looking superstructure, for stealth purposes, no doubt.

I’m not sure if it’s just me, but they look very much like other contemporary European Frigates with the bow and superstructure looks, such as the Dutch Zeven Provincien and the Norwegian Otto Sverdrup classes, but with aspects of the Danish Absalon corvettes too.

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Musician Ernest and Petty Officer Edward Gallagher

HMS Indefatigable one of the wrecks from the B...

HMS Indefatigable sinking (Image via Wikipedia)

Jutland is well-reputed to have touched virtually every family in Portsmouth. But for the Gallagher family, it had a particularly heavy toll.

Petty Officer Stoker Edward Gallagher was 50 in 1916. He had been born in Crawley in Sussex on 4 August 1865. His son Musician Ernest John Gallagher was born in Portsmouth on 8 September 1896. He joined the Royal Marines Band Service on 19 September 1910, when he was just 14 years old. By May 1916, he was 19.

In 1916 Edward Gallagher was serving onboard the Battlecruiser HMS Invincible, whilst Ernest was part of the Royal Marines Band onboard another Battlecruiser, HMS Indefatigable. Both ships were sunk at the Battle of Jutland on 31 May to 1 June 1916. HMS Indefatigable was ripped apart by a huge explosion, with only two men out of a crew of 1,017. Invincible was also destroyed by a explosion, and out of her crew of 1,026 officers and men, only six survived.

Both father and son have no known grave other than the sea, and are remembered on the Portsmouth Naval Memorial on Southsea Common. Mary Gallagher would have received not one but two terse telegrams from the Admiralty in the days after Jutland. She survived them for almost 30 years, dying in Portsmouth in 1946. She was 76.

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