After experiencing heavy air raids at San Carlos, and some very brave flying by Argentine pilots, the Task Force commanders devised a new tactic to try and give early warning of air raids, and also to shoot down offending aircraft before they got close to the vulnerable landing ships or the carriers out to sea.
HMS Coventry – a Type 42 Destroyer – and HMS Broadsword -a Type 22 Frigate – were paired up and stationed north of Pebble Island, ‘up threat’ as a radar picket and trap for Argentine aircraft heading for San Carlos. Coventry was armed with Sea Dart, a medium-range anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapon. Broadsword had the new Sea Wolf system, more ideal for close range work. The idea was that Broadsword could defend Coventry, whilst Coventry’s long range radar and Sea Dart could pick off incoming threats. This was specifically suggested by the Commanding Officers of both ships. Of the three Type 42 Destroyers that had originally sailed with the Task Force, one had been sunk (Sheffield) and another had been badly damaged (Glasgow), both by air attack. The ‘Type 64′ combo took up position north of Pebble Island on 21 May.
Coventry had had an eventful – and rather succesful war – thus far. One of the ships on Exercise Spring Train before being sent south to the Falklands, she entered the Total Exclusion Zone on the 1st of May, taking up picket duties in advance of the Task Force. She alternated between acting as a radar picket and bombarding shore positions around Stanley. For these shore bombardments she was teamed up with HMS Broadsword, for extra defence. On 3 May Coventry’s Lynx was sent to attack the Argentine patrol ship Alfrez Sobral. The patrol boat was heavily damaged by the new Sea Skua missiles, and later boarded by the SBS. On 4 May – the day that HMS Sheffield was sunk – Coventry was to the north west of the task force, repairing her troublesome 909 Radar. Sheffield was in the south-western position that Coventry had occupied until that point when she was hit by an Exocet missile. On 9 May Coventry was sent closer to the Falklands in an attempt to lure out Argentine aircraft. Four Sea Dart missiles were fired – a Hercules transport escaped unharmed, one Puma Helicopter was destroyed and two A-4 Skyhawks may possibly have been shot down. Later on the same day Coventry directed two Sea Harriers to attack the spy ship Narwal.
Remaining off Pebble Island for several days, Coventry and Broadsword continued acting as a radar picket. Coventry directed numerous Sea Harrier patrols onto targets – this is a role performed by surface ships, escorts in particular, that is often overlooked. It is possible, in hindsight, that Coventry and Broadsword had been in the same position for too long, and it is clear that the Argentines were well aware that they were there and determined to do something about it.
25 May – Argentina’s national day – began in much the same hectic fashion. One Skyhawk was shot down after returning from a raid on San Carlos, and another Skyhawk was splashed, this time directly attacking Coventry and Broadsword. The second raid, however, had more luck. Of the six airfraft – in two waves of three – two returned to base before reaching the Falklands. Flying low and using the land mass of West Falkland as radar cover, Coventry was unable to pick up the Skyhawks on their radars. Broadsword DID pick them up, but called OFF a Sea Harrier patrol. Coventry’s radar – designed for operating in open sea – was struggling to pick up the aircraft against Peble Island’s land signature. Small arms fire diverted the first two Skyhawks towards Broadsword. Her Sea Wolf locked on, but unable to distinguish between the two targets, for all intents and purposes went to sleep. Defenceless, one of the Skyhawk’s bombs hit the sea, bounced up and passed through the flight deck, destroying the Lynx helicopter in the process.
The second wave pressed on soon after. Once again Coventry and Broadsword declined assistance from the Sea Harriers, confident that the threat could be dealt with. Coventry fired a single Sea Dart and missed. Broadsword locked on with her Sea Wolf, but at the last minute Coventry, carrying out evasive maneouvres, slewed right in front of Broadsword’s line of fire. The first Skyhawk pilot fired his cannon at the hangar, before releasing his bombs – three 550lb general bombs. All three struck, and exploded seconds later. The second Skyhawk failed to release its bombs.
A large hole was torn in the port side, and men were killed in the auxiliary machine space, the computer room and the dining room where a first aid party were mustered. The explosion in the computer room wrecked the operations room above. Fire spread through the ship, and water poured in through the gaping hole. Smoke and fire spread beyond the capabilities of damage control, particularly as the ops room – the nerve centre of the ship – had been taken out. No order to abandon ship was given, but it was obvious to all onboard that the Coventry was sinking. Quietly and efficiently, liferafts were deployed. Broadsword began picking up survivors, and helicopters began arriving from San Carlos water. Many men – including Captain Hart-Dyke – simply stepped off of the upturned hull into lifeboats. Twenty minutes after being hit, HMS Coventry sank – the fourth Royal Navy warship lost in the Falklands, and the third in four days since the landings at San Carlos. Coventry’s survivors were later returned home on the QE2. 22 men were killed, and one man died in 1983 of his injuries.
Although the loss of any warship is hard to take – and especially the loss of lives – Coventry had performed admirably, and had probably saved countless ships at San Carlos and in the Task Force from being attacked and sunk. Such is the lot of Royal Navy warships sometimes. I’ve always found it intriguing that Coventry was sunk in a manner almost identical to Lieutenant-Commander Bill Hussey’s HMS Lively in 1942. Different war, 40 years apart, but the same spirit.
The Board of Inquiry absolved Coventry’s crew of any blame. Coventry was noted to be well prepared for war, having spent much time training and 6 months serving with NATO standing forces in the North Sea in 1981, in addition to Exercise Spring Train. However, there were a few lingering mechanical difficulties, such as the 909 radar. The Board of Inquiry – and others – did find that the ships had a lack of close in weapons, beyond missile systems, and this was rectified with the fitting of Phalanx and Goalkeeper to many ships soon after the Falklands War. Coventry and Broadsword had been instructed not to call on Sea Harrier support unless absolutely necessary, as this might chase enemy aircraft away rather than destroy them. Both ships had worked well together. It was found, however, that Coventry was not sufficiently trained for inshore anti-air warfare work. This is not surprising, given that the ship was designed for open-water warfare against the Eastern Bloc in the North Atlantic.
Related articles
- Miranda Hart’s father relives terrifying Falklands ordeal, 30 years after his ship HMS Coventry sank in the war (dailymail.co.uk)
- A last hurrah for Sea Dart as the missile roars off Scotland 20 April 2012 – these were the new missile system when I was doing my GI’s course – maybe I am getting old now (johnandmeicurrin.wordpress.com)
- A last hurrah for Sea Dart as the missile roars off Scotland 20 April 2012 – these were the new missile system when I was doing my GI’s course – maybe I am getting old now (rnzngunners.wordpress.com)
- Falklands 30 – Bomb Alley (dalyhistory.wordpress.com)
- Falklands 30 – The San Carlos Landings (dalyhistory.wordpress.com)
- Sea Harrier, the forgotten hero that won the war in the Falklands. To be replaced by the F-35B. (theaviationist.com)
- Falklands 30 – Pebble Island and Mikado: Special Forces in the Falklands (dalyhistory.wordpress.com)
The BOI report is here:
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F5811078-B4DB-42B9-8D3E-47BFB86D4B50/0/boi_hms_coventry.pdf
I’ve found the BOI’s fascinating. There are so many little aspects in them that no-one has written about in the context of 1982 – once only suits, liferafts, trauma, shock, first aid, firefighting, stress, what makes a ‘happy ship’, etc.
Ward maintains that Type 64 only came about because 800′s CAP was too high which allowed “leakers” (?) in from the north. I wonder if T42 had been built to the same (and standards) as T82 and had been SeaWolf armed whether they were succumbed to so much damage. We will never know.
The T42′s were, in hindsight, a one-trick pony I think with regard to Sea Dart. A medium-long range missile system is great for area defence, but then not providing the ship with the means to defend itself means that that asset is at risk anyway.
Warships aren’t there to defend themselves but to bring violence to the enemy. If T42 had to forego a weapon system it would be SeaWolf. There are lots of concepts for alternatively armed T42 and other T4x series destroyers showing SeaWolf fit outs. A better gun for AW work than Mk8 would have been sensible such as the Oto Melera 76mm; the latter entered service in December 82 with the Peacock class.
I think what I was trying to get at is that an impressive missile system – such as Sea Dart was in 1982 – is no good if it is laying at the bottom of the South Atlantic. Nut granted, it is a philosophical question.
Have there ever been any warships with two complementary anti-air missile systems fitted? Or is it too complex to run two systems in one hull?
same size
If T42 had been built with Phlalanx it would have been different. Perhaps the biggest thing they lacked was Organic AEW.
Yes. I have large collection of FW books. And the more you read of the naval war the more that lack of AEW becomes highlighted. Perhaps too much faith in first generation missile systems like SeaCat when a rapid 2in or 3in gun may have been better.
Has anyone seen that documentary on the Falklands, made in the mid-1980′s, looking at some of the technological lessons, such as Sea King AEW’s? I know it’s on youtube, and its got Sharkey Ward talking about the Sea Harrier. Hence it will probably make anyone of a light blue persuasion have a fit!
I shall look it out after TT.
If all escorts in 1982 had had modern CIWS the war might have been very different – look at the amount of ships lost or damaged when the missile systems did not work for whatever reason, but there might have been time for a last-ditch salvo from something like Phalanx?
SeaDart and SeaWolf worked wonderfully; just not in two hulls in the same piece of sea. SeaMouse, well, as very early example of its type was never going to be wonderful. Rather like a cannon on a late Medieval battlefield it was going to be more lethal to those using it than the enemy. Remember the system SeaMouse should have replaced STAAG was taken out of service for being unreliable because it pushed the technology of the time to its limits. More 40mm and 20mm wouldn’t have gone amiss but not on board the ships scattered on the hills around San Carlos Water on the threat axis. At the time the Continentals and Americans were still fond of large calibre auto-cannon; remember Rapier to one side the Army weren’t to keen on AAW either. Then again that may have pushed the Argentines higher allowing their bombs to fuse…….
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The programme is here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LqV4YKMMkUk
Of course, current politicians know better…