Daily Archives: 28 December, 2011

ANZAC #12 – Private Thomas Lynch

I thought having reached the W’s I had concluded my look at the Australian Great War soldiers buried in Milton Cemetery, but it seems that I had overlooked Private Thomas Lynch.

Lynch was born in Adelaide, in South Australia, the son of Henry and Mary Lynch. Enlisting at Keswick on 25 July 1915, he was aged 18, and lived on the corner of Auckland and Ifauld Streets in Adelaide. He was an unapprenticed boilermakers assistant. He was 5 foot 7 inches tall, weighed 140lbs, had chest measurements of 33 and 35.5 inches, a medium complexion, brown eyes (with good eyesight), light brown hair, was a Roman Catholic and had two vaccination marks on his left arm. As an 18 year old he required his mothers permission to enlist, which was duly given.

Upon joining Thomas Lynch was posted to K Group, Base Infantry at Mitcham. Whilst there he was fined a days pay for going absent without leave. Before leaving Australia he was posted to A Company of the 32nd Battalion, Australian Infantry. Lynch embarked from Adelaide on 18 November 1915, onboard the HMAT Geelong (A2). He arrived at Suez on 16 December 1915. Whilst at Tel-el-Kebir on 14 March 1916 he was punished for failing to have his kit stacked properly, and at Moascar on 6 June 1916 he was punished for quitting the ranks without permission. He was awarded four days of Field Punishment Number 2 – being shackled. Not long after this incident Lynch embarked to join the BEF, at Alexandria on 17 June onboard the Transport Transylvania. Disembarking at Marseilles on 23 June.

Lynch was wounded at Fromelles on 20 July 1916, receiving gunshot wounds to his left thigh. He was admitted to the 8th Field Ambulance and then the 8th Casualty Clearing Station. By the next day he was at the 32nd Stationary Hospital in Wimereux. His wound was obviously slight, as a day later he was discharged to the 1st Convalescence Camp, also at Wimereux. Four days later, after processing through the Base Details Depot at Etaples, he returned to the Battalion on 15 August 1916.

Lynch was wounded again in the winter of 1916. On 29 November, whilst on the Somme sectory, he received gunshot wounds to his right arm and right thigh. Admitted to the 38th Casualty Clearing Station, the next day he was in the 2nd General Hospital. On 3 December he was embarked on the Hospital Ship Gloucester Castle, and taken across the channel to the 5th Southern General Hospital in Portsmouth. Sadly, at 2.30am on 18 December 1916 Private Thomas Lynch died of his wounds. He was buried in Milton Cemetery two days later.

Strangely, AIF HQ in London received the report of his funeral before being informed of his death, which no doubt resulted in some administrative hair-pulling. After his death, it transpired that Thomas was not actually the biological son of Henry and Mary Lynch. In correspondence with Australian Army officials, Mary Lynch referred to him as her adopted son. He had been brought up by her since he was a baby, and he never knew that she was not his mother. She had never told anyone. Despite this, Mary Lynch was paid Thomas’s estate of £16.3.6 on 3 December 1917, and received a fortnightly pension of 15/- from 26 February 1917.

And in a fascinating insight into the attitudes of a bereaved mother, Mary Lynch also had this to say in correnspondence with officials:

There is not one thing in the world this minute that I longed to have more than a photo of his grave. How I yearned to have that photo no one knows. I pray that it will not be long before we will have a glorious victory over those inhuman brutes of Germans.

Oddly, there is no report of Lynch’s funeral in his service records, nor any detailed hospital records of how exactly he died. We do know, however, that his personal effects were sent back home to his mother. They consisted of:

Cigarette Case, Rosary, part of Rosary, Shaving brush (damaged), 7 religious medallions, wallet, money belt, prayer book, Postcards, 2 cotton bags, scarf, cap-comforter, razor strop, pipe.

This suggests that he was quite a religious young lad. Funnily enough, most of the 12 ANZAC’s we have looked at had either cigarettes or pipes, which is interesting. The Great War is often cited as an example of how cigarettes replaced pipe tobacco, as they were easier to transport up to the front line.

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Refighting the Falklands War (2012): Frigates and Destroyers

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In my 2009 review of the possibility of fighting another Falklands War, I identified a lack of escorts – Frigates and Destroyers – as a critical problem that might inhibit Britain’s ability to retake the Falklands after a hypothetical Argentine invasion.

In order to assess whether the Royal Navy has a suitable number of hulls, we need to assess what tasks Frigates and Destroyers are needed to perform. I can think of the following off the top of my head:

The Technology

In 1982 the type 42 Destoyers were used as up-front radar pickets ahead of the main force. It was in this role that HMS Sheffield was sunk by an Exocet Missile, whilst acting as a radar picket along with her sister ships HMS Coventry and HMS Glasgow. The Type 965 air surveillance radar carried by the Type 42‘s in 1982 had a reasonable range of 230 nautical miles, but was becoming obsolescent and was due to be replaced by the more advanced Type 1022 system with a range of 225 nm. But using their radars three ships could still provide a reasonable radar screen, ahead of the main force. True, HMS Sheffield was hit, but that was partly due to her radar being ineffective at an unfortunate moment, and in addition, better to lose a destroyer than a carrier.

Fast Forward to 2012, and the Royal Navy has three Type 45 Destroyers in commission having passed all sea trials, with another – HMS Dragon – due to be commissioned in Spring 2012. The Type 45’s use a SAMPSON air surveillance radar, far in advance of anything that the Royal Navy possessed in 1982. It has been reported that SAMPSON is so effective, that in exercises with the US Navy a Type 45 Destroyer was asked to switch it off as it was ‘inhibiting training’. Specifications for SAMPSON are hard to come by, the best I can find is a range of 400 kilometres, which translates to around 250 miles. But apparently the picture is much more detailed, the false-alarm ratio is much lower, and it is all-round more effective.

In 1982 the Royal Navy could only deploy two of its new Type 22 Class Frigates, carrying Sea Wolf close range missile system. Both of these carried the original GWS-25 conventional launch system, fired using type 967/968 radar combinations. The rest of the Task Force’s Frigates and Destroyers were only armed with obsolete Sea Slug and Sea Cat systems. The Royal Navy’s Type 23 Frigates now fire vertical launch Sea Wolf, controlled by Type 996 radar. A combination of SAMPSON/Sea Viper and Type 996/VLS Sea Wolf is far in advance of what could be offered in 1982, especially when we consider that the Argentine Navy and Air Force’s equipment has hardly improved.

In an ironic sense, the likely lack of an aircraft carrier would release a couple of escort vessels from air defence duties, although the same role would still need to be performed escorting the amphibious group, or any other valuable or vulnerable group of ships in the Task Force. In a similar manner, ships would have to provide initial air defence for any invasion and subsequent landing zone, before Rapier could become effective – much as in 1982.

One problem I identified back in 2009 was the presence in the Argentine fleet of 13 Excoet equipped Destroyers and Frigates. One would hope that the advanced Type 45 and Type 23 technology would prove to be more than a match for this – and any Exocet equipped Super Etendards – but it does show up a shortcoming in anti-surface capability in the Royal Navy today. Exocet has a range of 43 miles, or 110 if fitted with a booster. This should be well within the range of SAMPSON in the long reach and Type 996 in the short distance, but do we have enough ships to provide defence against so many possible threats? However, since 1982 all RN ships DO have improved Close in weapons defences – be it Goalkeeper, Phalanx or Chaff.

The Type 23 Frigates carry Harpoon anti-surface missiles, which have a range of up to 136 miles, depending on which variant is carried (which I am struggling to find out). Hence Harpoon seems to outrange Exocet by some distance, but following the withdrawal of the Batch 3 Type 22 Frigates, there are only 13 Type 23’s in service. Not all of them would be available at any one time thanks to standing commitments and refits, and when we consider that at least a couple would be required for close-in air defence, only a few at most would be available for forming a surface-action group to combat the Argentine Exocet ships. The Typ3 45 Destroyers are designed to carry Harpoon as an upgrade – there is even space in the ops room for the operators desk – but they do not currently carry them. With the decomissioning of the four Batch 3 Type 22’s, I wonder if their Harpoon launchers and systems could be utilised? The the MOD would only need to purchase two new systems. It depends if the Type 22’s are to be scrapped or sold as going concerns.

The Argentine Navy does have a paucity of Submarines compared to 1982, fielding only three diesel electrics of TR-1700 and Type 209 class. If the performance of the Argentine submarine arm in 1982 is anything to go by, the Royal Navy need not fear too much. The Royal Navy has an expertise in anti-submarine warfare, a legacy of the Cold War. However, of the 13 Type 23 Frigates, only a number of them actually carry towed-array sonars for anti-submarine work – this could be something of a problem. All Frigates or Destroyers carry Merlin or Lynx helicopters for ASW, which one should imagine would provide good defence against submarines. However, the lack of an aircraft carrier might inhibit the carrying of further ASW Sea Kings as in 1982. In the same manner, a lack of AEW might be a problem.

In terms of naval gunfire support, the Royal Navy learnt a big lesson in 1982 – you can never have too many ships with a traditional main gun. As a result the Type 22 Class was modified to carry a 4.5 inch gun, and the Type 23 and Type 45 Classes all have the up to date Mark 8 4.5 inch gun. At Navy Days 2009 I was informed that the 4.5 inch gun direction actually has an offset built in, as in the Falklands it was found that the fire was too accurate – pretty much putting roundsi nto the same holes. Obviously for harrassing fire this is no good. A Task Force in the South Atlantic should be able to provide reasonable gun fire support, but a lack of Tomahawk LAM equipped surface ships is lamentable – although these are carried on our SSN’s, more of them on surface ships would really put the fear up the Argentines.

The verdict

Technologically, the Royal Navy has progressed in leaps and bounds since 1982, and can offer up radar and weapon systems that should more than prove a match for anything it might encounter in the South Atlantic. The only problem I can identify is a lack of hulls. With advances in technology, the number of ships keeps getting cut to subsidise the improved systems on each hull. With Four Type 45 Destroyers, three Type 42’s, and 13 Type 23’s, that gives only 20 Escort vessels in total. We would do very well indeed to get ten or twelve of them into action for a task force. Whilst one Type 45 Destroyer could probably do the job of two Type 42’s, if it is hit, it can’t do the job of any. A ship can only be in one place at any one time, and hence the politicians and admirals boasts that advances in technology make a lack of ships irrelevant should be treated with caution.

Ggiven that the Argentine Air Force and Navy haven’t really progressed since 1982, I wouldn’t imagine that any Type 45’s or Type 23’s down south would encounter too many problems. The problem would be getting enough of them there in the first place to do everything that we would need them to do. In recent months the RN has struggled to have ONE escort available in coastal waters alone. It could indeed be a close run thing once wear and tear and possible losses come into play.

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